Executive Summary
The current global arms control regime is in disarray. Treaties that were once the pillars of the arms control regime have collapsed. The United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 after Russia violated the treaty, and from the Open Skies Treaty in 2020, which Russia left in 2021. President Vladimir Putin announced in 2023 Russia’s suspension of New START, one of the last binding agreements between the United States and Russia. Given the turbulent state of international affairs, characterized by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, strategic competition with Russia and China, and expansion of military capabilities, including nuclear modernization programs, arms control is needed more than ever.
This publication explores the traditional nuclear arms control regime, how it has become fractured over time, and the ways in which it can be strengthened. Nadezhda Arbatova explores arms control from a European perspective and highlights the significance of arms control in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. She calls for the restoration of arms control treaties, such as New START, as well as greater Russian-Western collaboration on arms control to restore security in Europe. George Perkovich examines the difficulties of achieving arms control for the United States, Russia, and China and argues for the necessity of arms restraint. Paul van Hooft also explores arms control from a European perspective and argues Europeans ought to play a more prominent role in shaping the European and global arms control regime.
“European Security after the Ukraine Conflict: Respice Finem,” by Nadezhda Arbatova
In her essay, Nadezhda Arbatova (Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences) discusses the origins and dilemmas of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict, the opportunities for building a new European security architecture, and new approaches to arms control to counteract the disintegration of the arms control regime.
The Russia-Ukraine warfare, which symbolizes a breakdown of Russian-Western relations since the end of the Cold War as well as the collapse of the existing European security architecture, has three faces. First, because of the wider interpretations of the conflict’s origins and its historical context, the ongoing military confrontation demonstrates Russia’s and the West’s conflicting perceptions of their versions of a post–Cold War European security framework. Second, this crisis can be seen as a culmination of the rivalry between Russian-Western spheres of influence. Third, it can also be seen as stemming from the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Arbatova discusses a number of key points pertaining to the conflict, including European public opinion, the risks of nuclear escalation, trends in the European security landscape stemming from the Ukrainian conflict, and scenarios that describe how the warfare in Ukraine may unfold. However, one topic worth considering in greater detail is Arbatova’s discussion of new approaches to arms control. She notes that while arms control has been a key element in the current world order, it has experienced breakthroughs and setbacks. Prior to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the arms control regime was noticeably deteriorating, which led to concerns of a new arms race. The durability of the regime was challenged during the Trump administration. The United States withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020. Trump threatened to do the same with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and considered letting New START expire. While the Biden administration (in contrast to the Trump administration) agreed to the Russian proposal to extend New START, Putin in two years announced Russia’s suspension of the treaty in the context of acute confrontation with the West on the Ukrainian conflict. This action is significant as the suspension could potentially lead to an uninhibited strategic offensive arms race with Russia and may reinforce a likelihood of future withdrawals from other treaties.
Arbatova notes that the declining interest in keeping the arms control regime alive can be explained through the emergence of new technologies and the absence of new arms control methods to address them. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that Russia and the West have returned to a new Cold War, leading to a possible confrontation between states. Moreover, she also discusses an existing dilemma with respect to the nuclear strategic balance. Although radical reductions of nuclear weapons have strengthened strategic stability, the existing nuclear arsenals are still a threat. While new technologies and weapons systems do not compare to the devastating power of the current stockpile of nuclear weapons, the impact of new destructive technologies and weapons systems on the strategic balance should be further explored.
Arbatova concludes by discussing where we might go from here. She writes, “what has been destroyed will need to be rebuilt.”1 Restoring Russia’s full participation in New START is a necessary condition to any arms control negotiations. Once New START has been restored, subsequent negotiations can focus on important proposals, such as limits on tactical nuclear weapons or limits on ballistic missile defense systems.
Finally, in order to address the current crisis in Russian-Western relations due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the disintegration of the arms control regime, Arbatova emphasizes the importance of rebuilding trust through diplomatic negotiations and agreement, which would resemble the hard-earned trust in the late 1980s and 1990s. One possible way forward is through greater Russian-Western collaboration on the arms control regime in order to restore trust and security in Europe. Yet, efforts toward true European security must start with reconciliation between Russia and Ukraine.
“No Losers: Making Arms Control Work,” by George Perkovich
In his essay, George Perkovich (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) examines the topics of competition and arms control. He explores why the United States (and its allies), on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other hand, compete for military gains as opposed to pursuing arms control. He argues that achieving stability will only be possible when domestic politics change enough to allow arms control to happen.
Perkovich develops his argument by first discussing the growing competition between the United States, Russia, and China, each of which are modernizing and, in China’s case, expanding their military capabilities across a wide range of nuclear weapons systems. The growing risks to global peace and stability make military and arms restraint a more desirable approach. Perkovich suggests that seeking new norms of behavior could be a realistic initial approach.
He continues by discussing some of the political challenges associated with arms control and restraint. Russia, China, and North Korea have serious reservations about engaging in arms control with the United States, for these leaders fear that the United States may seek to limit their military power in order to enact regime change. The United States, conversely, assumes these adversaries will cheat on any agreement. Perkovich suggests signaling intent by embracing mutual vulnerability and negotiating limits on observable weapons that would threaten the second-strike deterrent of U.S. adversaries.
However, to actualize effective arms control, the United States must get its own house in order. Perkovich notes that “When American political actors are unwilling to compromise with one another at home they will generally be unable to compromise with foreign adversaries.”2 He advises overcoming the challenges of negotiating nuclear arms control and restraint by relying on secrecy and back channels to protect leaders from domestic political opponents, much like what occurred during the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis at the height of the Cold War.
Perkovich also tackles the intersection between emerging technology and nuclear capabilities. All three major powers are developing techniques to hold at-risk targets, along with their command, control, and communication systems, with malware, kinetic, and nuclear payloads. To complicate matters even further, arms control rests on the capacity of states to quantify and verify nuclear weapons and related military assets. Emerging technology, such as artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities, are incredibly difficult to quantify and verify. Yet, Perkovich notes that “these emerging capabilities are not likely to diminish the priority of controlling the kinetic weapons that pose the greater threat to nuclear deterrents, and therefore to stability.”3
Perkovich concludes by laying out some next steps worth exploring. Given the near impossibility of securing bipartisan Senate support for arms control treaties, he suggests that we must consider non-legally binding agreements. With respect to Russia, predicting a future arms control trajectory is nearly impossible while the Ukraine war ensues. Turning to China, President Xi would need to lay out the conditions under which he would be willing to consider nuclear restraint and arms control, as well as the goals and objectives that would guide China’s approach. The United States can measure Chinese and Russian intentions by discussing possible limitations on missile defense interceptors, which, in any case, are not effective enough to stymie large attacks.
Perkovich emphasizes that the challenges of arms control “will need to focus ever more on states’ behaviors and the targets and effects of operations rather than on hardware or software.”4
He adds that negotiated restraint is desirable among nuclear-armed states because it communicates an intent to avoid war, and will ultimately be safer and more cost-effective than unrestrained arms racing where advantages that might be gained by any side will be short-lived and illusory.
“Deter, Compete, and Engage: Europe’s Responsibility within the Arms Control Regime after Ukraine, with or without the United States,” by Paul van Hooft
In his essay, Paul van Hooft (Hague Centre for Strategic Studies) argues that Europeans should take a greater role in designing and shaping the European and global arms control regime. He notes that the current arms control regime that was first established during the Cold War has collapsed over the last few decades and that reestablishing arms control with Russia is not a priority in the United States or in most European states as long as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine persists. Moreover, the willingness to engage with Russia—even on a common interest such as arms control—varies within Europe, particularly between Western Europe, on the one hand, and Central and Eastern Europe, on the other. Yet, according to Van Hooft, while the difficulties of establishing arms control are high, the need for restraint in nuclear weapons and their missile defense delivery systems is greater than ever.
Van Hooft outlines two interpretations of strategic stability. Strategic stability (type 1) is a narrower definition and pertains to the dynamics between nuclear-armed great powers that directly relate to the types and quantities of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Strategic stability (type 2) highlights the dynamics of the international system and the tensions between status quo and revisionist states. Strategic stability (type 2) is more political and emphasizes “the tensions between nuclear-armed great powers that are satisfied or dissatisfied with the international status quo.”5 The two types of stability are not mutually independent, as strategic stability (type 1) can impact strategic stability (type 2). Moreover, Van Hooft states that the reinvigoration of arms control in and by Europe should consider the broader trends of the impact of both types of strategic stability. These trends include nuclear multipolarity, intensifying geopolitical competition, and technological developments. These trends are significant, as they “not only suggest the need for but also complicate efforts to reinvigorate the global arms control regime.”6
Van Hooft also discusses the growing role and reliance on nuclear coercion and threat of Russian nuclear escalation. With respect to the former, Van Hooft, citing others, notes that Putin’s threats to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine was seen as a plausible avenue for the Russians to prevent the reversal of expected gain and to deter direct involvement with NATO. In terms of the threat of Russian nuclear escalation, he notes that many leaders fear that Russia’s second-strike capability has been weakened, while the addition of new members to NATO has also brought closer NATO capabilities that threaten the second-strike.
Van Hooft explains that the European approach to arms control, which has rested mainly on multilateralism, is not well-suited to address these threats. Given the high stakes associated with Russia’s hostilities in Ukraine, as well as its existing nuclear stockpile and missile defense systems, which are more likely to be directed at European targets, Van Hooft is critical of the European multilateral approach, noting that such an approach “is likely to be dead on arrival.”7 He contends that “Europeans could consider other, less-cooperative approaches to arms control and engagement with Russia as they reinforce their collective defense and deterrence capabilities through increased defense spending.”8
He also describes three avenues that could point toward a greater European engagement with arms control and that would play a role in helping Europe secure its own security. First, with respect to the trans-atlantic relationship, Europeans should place greater prioritization on arms control and strategic stability. Given the U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific and greater preoccupation with China, “interests on both sides of the Atlantic would be served by a redistribution of existing burdens. A transatlantic redistribution of burdens would require the Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their own security.”9 Second, with respect to China, Europe can serve as a kind of interlocutor for Chinese arms control and strategic stability measures. This could pave the way for a more comprehensive arms control approach between the United States and China. Finally, with respect to Russia, Van Hooft notes that Europe needs to be prepared to engage directly with Russia, given that it has the most to lose from Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. He writes, a “competitive European approach would be premised on using the increasing investments in defense already underway as a consequence of Russia’s war in Ukraine to build capabilities that would further unsettle Russian confidence in the security of its second-strike capability.”10 In short, European investments in conventional deterrence might also incentivize Russia to engage with Europe, without ignoring the fears of Central and Eastern European NATO and EU member states.
Van Hooft ends by emphasizing that regardless of the actions Europe takes, it should be fully aware that Europeans needs to take greater responsibility for their own security in the new geopolitical environment, which includes engaging more in the European and global arms control regime.
This publication was supported by the Raymond Frankel Foundation as part of the American Academy’s project on Promoting Dialogue on Arms Control and Disarmament.
Endnotes
- 1Nadezhda Arbatova, “European Security after the Ukraine Conflict: Respice Finem,” in Nadezhda Arbatova, George Perkovich, and Paul van Hooft, The Future of Nuclear Arms Control and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2024), 21.
- 2George Perkovich, “No Losers: Making Arms Control Work,” in Arbatova, Perkovich, and Van Hooft, The Future of Nuclear Arms Control and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, 41.
- 3Ibid., 47.
- 4Ibid., 61.
- 5Paul van Hooft, “Deter, Compete, and Engage: Europe’s Responsibility within the Arms Control Regime after Ukraine, with or without the United States,” in Arbatova, Perkovich, and Van Hooft, The Future of Nuclear Arms Control and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War, 78.
- 6Ibid., 81.
- 7Ibid., 88.
- 8Ibid.
- 9Ibid., 91.
- 10Ibid., 93.