James D. Morrow

First scholar to apply non-cooperative game theory to model non-nuclear crises and to pinpoint the impact of selection effects on previous empirical research. Pioneered in developing the micro-foundations of systemic theories of international conflict and cooperation as well as in research into crisis bargaining and resolution, the formation and termination of alliances, why arms races could lead to war, how power transitions could lead to war, the structural foundations of international political economy, compliance with prisoner of war treaties, domestic politics and international bargaining and economic growth. Cofounder and developer of the selectorate theory. Developed a highly influential alternative to the standard capabilities aggregation view of alliance formation, focusing instead on the trade-off between gains in security and gains in autonomy. Demonstrated the difficulties in designing international organizations that simultaneously solve coordination, distribution, monitoring and sanctioning problems effectively. Through book, Game Theory for Political Scientists (1994), made it possible for political science graduate and undergraduate students to learn to use strategic reasoning rigorously in their studies and research.