Alastair Smith

Professor of Politics. Principal developer of the selectorate theory of political leadership. This theory redirected research in comparative and international politics and the political economy of development to focus on how institutional incentives structure the taxing and spending decisions of leaders motivated primarily by their own political survival. He shows that leaders who depend on a small coalition, especially when drawn from a large pool of prospective supporters, emphasize private goods allocation over public goods, encourage corruption and rent-seeking and use foreign aid to maximize political tenure at the expense of their citizenry. He also shows that the larger the coalition on which a leader relies, the greater the emphasis on effective public policy as the efficient means to survive in power. He demonstrates the coalition-size threshold at which revolution leads to democratization or further consolidation of dictatorship. As a complement to this work he developed the theory of leader-specific punishment that informs analysis of the efficacy of sanctions and the impact of leader change on economic growth, bond prices, and foreign policy choices. Smith also pioneered the theoretical and empirical investigation of selection effects in analyses of complex strategic decisions relating to war and peace. Winner of the Political Economy Section of the American Political Science Association, Karl Deutsch Award from International Studies Association, and Distinguished Young Scholar. Books include The Dictator's Handbook (with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita), Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change (with Fiona McGillivray), Election Timing (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions), and The Logic of Political Survival (with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow).