




AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES

Bulletin

WWW.AMACAD.ORG

SUMMER 2013
VOL. LXVI, NO. 4



The Heart of the Matter *The Humanities and Social Sciences for a vibrant, competitive, and secure nation*



The Benefit of Public Investment in Higher Education: California and Beyond

*Robert D. Haas, Mary Sue Coleman, Henry E. Brady, and
Robert J. Birgeneau*



The Third Wave of Immigration

Jorge Castañeda, Mary C. Waters, and Douglas S. Massey

ALSO: The Humanities and Global Engagement
The Arab Spring: What Next?
Learning from Fukushima: Improving Nuclear Safety and Security
after Accidents

Upcoming Events

OCTOBER

11th – 13th

Induction Weekend – Cambridge

11th – *A Celebration of the Arts and Humanities and Awarding of the Emerson-Thoreau Medal and Award for Humanistic Studies*

12th – *Induction Ceremony*

13th – *Program on the Arts and Sciences*

OCTOBER

18th

Sanders Theatre, Harvard University,
Cambridge

Fall Concert: Verdi

Introduction: **Philip Gossett**, Robert W. Reneker Distinguished Service Professor of Music Emeritus, University of Chicago

Performance: **Ensemble Nuove Musiche**

For updates and additions to the calendar, visit www.amacad.org.

Presentations


- 2 *The Heart of the Matter: The Humanities and Social Sciences for a vibrant, competitive, and secure nation*
- 13 The Humanities and Global Engagement
- 18 The Benefit of Public Investment in Higher Education: California and Beyond
- 30 The Arab Spring: What Next?
- 40 The Third Wave of Immigration

Projects and Activities

- 47 *Dædalus* Examines “Immigration & the Future of America”
- 48 Learning from Fukushima: Improving Nuclear Safety and Security after Accidents
- 50 Time to Play Ball: editorial by Keith R. Yamamoto, ARISE II cochair

Updates on Members

- 51 Noteworthy



Clockwise from top left: *The Heart of the Matter*, Richard H. Brodhead, Karl W. Eikenberry, Mary Sue Coleman, Douglas S. Massey, Philip S. Khoury, Robert J. Birgeneau, and John Lithgow



The Heart of the Matter

*The Humanities and Social Sciences
for a vibrant, competitive, and secure nation*

On June 19, 2013, the Academy's Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences released its report, *The Heart of the Matter: The Humanities and Social Sciences for a vibrant, competitive, and secure nation*. An evening program at the Congressional Visitors Center in Washington, D.C., featured Commission Cochairs John W. Rowe and Richard H. Brodhead; Commission members David Brooks, Karl W. Eikenberry, Pauline Yu, and John Lithgow; Senators Lamar Alexander and Mark Warner; and Congressmen Tom Petri and David Price.

The Heart of the Matter has generated considerable media attention. Coverage has included op-eds written by Commission members as well as columns published in *Time* magazine, *USA Today*, and *The New York Times*. *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, *Inside Higher Ed*, *The Washington Post*, *The Atlantic*, CNN, and *Slate* published stories about *The Heart of the Matter*. In addition, several Commission members appeared on PBS *NewsHour* and NPR ran five segments across the country about the report.

Less than two months since its release, *The Heart of the Matter* has been downloaded from the Commission website almost 42,000 times, and the accompanying film, with appearances by Ken Burns and Yo-Yo Ma, has received 20,200 plays. Outreach efforts continue with at least fifteen events planned in cooperation with state humanities councils across the country, in cooperation with the Federation of State Humanities Councils and the National Humanities Alliance.

The following is an edited transcript of the presentations from the June 19th meeting.



John W. Rowe

John W. Rowe is Cochair of the American Academy's Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences and retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Exelon Corporation. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2009.

As a retired utility executive, amateur Byzantinist, and part-time high school history teacher, I was asked to cochair the Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences. The Commission is looking at the importance to our society of the array of things that relate to how and why we communicate with one another. It has been an honor to serve with my cochair, Richard Brodhead, president of Duke University, and to work with this most diverse, witty, and erudite group of Commission members.

My job tonight is to say thank you. Thank you, first, to Senators Lamar Alexander and Mark Warner and Representatives Tom

We find vast importance in what are called the humanities. That is why we titled our report *The Heart of the Matter: The Humanities and Social Sciences*. Our recommendations include additional public and private support for K-12 education as well as high culture, or the high arts.

Petri and David Price for calling on the Academy to form this Commission. Thank you to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation for its support of this Commission and its unwavering support of the humanities. Thank you also to Carnegie Corporation of New York for its support. And thank you to all who are here listening to us tonight.

As you might expect from such a diverse group as ours, we find vast importance in what are called the humanities. That is why we titled our report *The Heart of the Matter: The Humanities and Social Sciences*. Our recommendations include additional public and private support for K-12 education as well as high culture, or the high arts. We talk about history and the social sciences, as well as about dance and music. We believe we must maintain – and where possible, increase – our funding for those things. We do not believe it can all come from the federal government. We must all look for ways to help where we can.

Our work does not end tonight. To keep this report from becoming one more piece of paper collecting dust on a shelf, we must continue to get out in our cities and states, with people beyond our normal circles of contact, and explain why we care so much.



Richard H. Brodhead

Richard H. Brodhead is Cochair of the American Academy's Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences. He is President of Duke University and the William Preston Few Professor of English. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2004.

Our Commission was sponsored by Senator Alexander, Senator Warner, Representative Price, and Representative Petri. The fact that these four public servants have chosen to start and close their day with us acknowledges that we are talking about an issue of national welfare. It is also a rare bipartisan issue.

The core issue is this. Can this nation create the circumstances likely to produce the greatest number of highly capable people? People who have the equipment they need to lead rich personal lives, to fulfill their duty as citizens, to respond knowingly and imaginatively to a world that will keep changing?

If we can, our society is likely to prosper. But if we cannot, we will surely pay a price.

Education is at the root of the solution. Fortunately, in recent years, we have seen

We need a broader vision of education and human empowerment. . . . We are arguing for the complementarity of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences for the adequate training of the citizens of this country.

a growing national consensus about the importance of education to our social fate. At the same time, even as the public's sense of the critical role of education has grown, the sense of the goals of education has narrowed.

STEM education has many champions and few foes, but the authors of the *Gathering Storm* report did not think that science and technology subjects alone could produce a capable population. They knew we needed other skills.

Discussion of the goals of education has narrowed in a second way as well. Nowadays, it passes as a wise thought to say, "I don't want my children studying useless subjects. I want them to be able to get a job the day they get out of school."

But consider the people you know who have led capable, successful lives in the world. The number who studied only things that could get them a job the day they graduated is just about zero. The people who lead lives that become more meaningful and valuable to society as time goes on are people who had a broad base of education at the beginning, without knowing for certain what good it would do them. The knowledge they gained through education was still with them when they needed it at a later date.

At this time, we need a broader vision of education and human empowerment. We are not arguing against increased education in the sciences. We are arguing for the complementarity of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences for the adequate training of the citizens of this country.

The Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences came together in the name of this belief. It has been one of the great honors and pleasures of my life to serve on this committee, and I thank the members who made it so rewarding. Together, we have come up with a report that not only elucidates the value of the humanities and social sciences to our nation and its citizens, but lays out steps that would advance the cause.

Today is the day we begin to find out whether our report will make a difference. We are committed to ensuring that it will.

But two things are needed for it to make a difference. First, people who care about the values we are espousing need to speak up. There is no lack of such people, though the current discourse about education in our country might make you think otherwise. People who care about the values associated with the humanities and social sciences, people whose lives testify to the power these fields provide, need to say publicly why they matter. We need to make the case in many ways, to audiences of all kinds.

Second, our report makes concrete recommendations that, if enacted, will lead to significant change. No single agent will solve the problem, however. The solutions to the challenge we diagnose will involve everything from public schools to local historical societies and community arts organizations to colleges, universities, libraries, businesses, foundations, and state and federal governments.

Each has a role to play. But above all, we urge these parties to work more concertedly together, to see the humanities as part of a lifelong continuum that needs the support of many organizations at many phases of its life.

At the start of this program, a group of wonderful children sang: “If you want to get somewhere, you have got to do the things you need to do to get there.” This sage advice is my takeaway from this evening. We would all love to shake our fists at the senators and congresspeople and say, “Until you give us billions of dollars, we can’t be expected to make any progress on this problem.” But every individual and group who cares about these issues has work to do, because only through the totality of our efforts can we achieve the needed change. It’s time to get to work.



Lamar Alexander

Lamar Alexander is the Senior United States Senator from Tennessee.

This morning I ate breakfast with Philip Bredesen, the former governor of Tennessee. He said that one of the real privileges of a conspicuous public position, maybe the best privilege, is that you get to meet so many interesting people. And that would certainly be true of this remarkable Commission. Thank you for your work.

As you know, we are debating immigration in the Senate. The four most important words in the immigration debate are, “We are all Americans.” And how do we decide whether we are all Americans, and how important is it? If you want to become a citizen of China or Japan, you can’t become Japanese or Chinese, really. But if you want to become a citizen of the United States, you must become an American.

And how do you do that? Well, you do it by learning a common language and by understanding a few ideas and where they come from. And the ideas come from our very wise Founders.

Most of our wealth may come from the technological advances of the last fifty or sixty years. But most of our American character comes from a study and understanding of the humanities.

What did the Founders study? Well, they were students of history, language, classics, psychology, and law. They were students of the humanities. David McCullough said that they were marinated in the classics. Adams, Franklin, Jefferson, Madison, and Washington. They read essays by Locke, Hobbes, Smith, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.

The ideas that unite us as a country come from there. The right to life, liberty, and property: from Locke. Our three separate but equal branches of government: Montesquieu. The power of the people in a democratic government: Rousseau.

The late Samuel Huntington once said that most of our politics is about the collision of principles that unite us as a country and our disappointment with not reaching the goals we establish for ourselves. Goals such as all men are created equal. If we don’t know those goals and we don’t understand those principles, then we are not able to say why we are all Americans.

My first speech on the Senate floor was about the importance of putting the teaching of U.S. history back in its rightful place in our schools, so our children could grow up learning what it means to be an American. During my ten years in the Senate I have brought many outstanding U.S. history teachers onto the Senate floor to search for the Senate desks of Daniel Webster, Jefferson Davis, and their home state

senator. One of the great joys of my Senate career has been to see these teachers admire the government we have and to imagine what they will say to their students when they go home.

Among all of the other advantages of studying the humanities is the one we are debating in the U.S. Senate this week. Most of our wealth may come from the technological advances of the last fifty or sixty years. But most of our American character comes from a study and understanding of the humanities. By helping to lift the status of the humanities in our society, we help ourselves understand why we are all Americans.



Mark R. Warner

Mark R. Warner is the Senior United States Senator from the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Lamar and I started our day and are ending it with the humanities, but for the mid-part of the afternoon, we and sixteen other members of the Senate met with a group of Nobel Prize winners and members of the National Academy of Sciences to discuss issues related to energy.

If we are going to make the American character shine in the twenty-first century, not only do we need STEM, but we need the values that the humanities bring to the formation of our ideas and our American character.

As the meeting was breaking up, we mentioned that we were coming back here, and discussion turned to the humanities. There was general acknowledgment that the science and technology fields are connected to the humanities. These areas should not be competing, but complementary parts of a person's education.

I was in the telecommunications industry before I became involved in public life, and I sometimes think about the cell phone and how we somehow figured out a way to communicate with each other at almost any moment of every day. That's good, but these days the quality of that communication may not be so good.

The report that this Commission has produced will, I hope, serve as a guidepost in the same way the America COMPETES Act, legislation Lamar Alexander helped pass seven years ago, has been a guidepost for the STEM field. In this way we can perhaps make sure our communications carry a little more value.

One of the things that disappoints me so much about public discourse today is that rather than debating ideas, we too often resort to attacking if we disagree with others' ideas, their morality, their patriotism, their faith. I am not sure that the Founders who came together with the ideas that animate the Constitution, who worked out the Connecticut Compromise, would be welcome in either political party's caucus meetings in today's environment.

If we are going to make the American character shine in the twenty-first century, not only do we need STEM, but we need

the values that the humanities bring to the formation of our ideas and our American character.

Getting our nation's balance sheet right is one of my obsessions, and I would be the first to acknowledge that the responsibility for strengthening the humanities is shared by local communities, the private sector,

and each of us individually. But I also believe the federal government has a role to play.

We make choices, ultimately, by where we put our resources. We are now spending more than \$7 per person for every individual in this country over age sixty-five and less than \$1 for every person under thirty. If we expect a better quality of debate, if we expect our young people to become not just great scientists but to reflect the kind of ideas our Founders had, I would ask you to think about that ratio and its long-term viability for maintaining the America we all took advantage of.



Tom Petri

Tom Petri is U.S. Representative for Wisconsin's 6th congressional district.

No one can live or work in Washington for long without feeling the presence of the many people who with great seriousness laid the foundation of this country. What impresses me more now than ever about the humanities is that it is also about laying a foundation; it is not just a compartmentalized subject you study in school for a couple of years. If you are doing it seriously, it ends up being a lifelong exploration of your environment.

Those of us who signed the letters that helped to trigger this Commission have, every day, the opportunity to meet Americans from every walk of life. This morning, I met with a nurse anesthetist. She asked me what I was doing today, and after I explained she said, "Oh, I just finished the most wonderful course on music and math and how they are related."

At heart, the humanities are not about institutions and governments. Rather, they are about creating a framework in which

At heart, the humanities are not about institutions and governments. Rather, they are about creating a framework in which people can explore and develop themselves. As they do that, the country and its citizens become more productive and more equipped to preserve our democracy for future generations.

people can explore and develop themselves. As they do that, the country and its citizens become more productive and more equipped to preserve our democracy for future generations.

So, my thanks to the Commission members for the seriousness with which they undertook their task, and to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, and others for helping to fund the whole effort. What we have done is a great thing, and I hope it triggers further thought and productive change over the next few years.



David Price

David Price is U.S. Representative for North Carolina's 4th congressional district.

Let me also offer my thanks for the contributions many of you have made to this day and to this report. This has been quite a rollout, quite a day of extolling the report's recommendations, and resolving to act on the things we have learned and the things we have resolved to promote.

For me, days like this are always occasions for reflecting on the intellectual and cultural debts I owe, and I think that is probably true for every member of the Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences. I remember a class in American intellectual history that changed my mind about a lot of things. I remember the great courses and debates over the political thinkers of the past. I remember rediscovering the Hebrew prophets through theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr, who were wrestling with the political dilemmas of the day. I remember my own mother, an English teacher, who made sure every paper I wrote was graded twice.

The relationship of language training and analytic ability to our national security; or the importance of creative, innovative thinking to business enterprise: the Commission explored all of these issues.

So, we do have these debts. We need to reflect on this and draw on this background, this rich heritage and tradition that, though particular to each of our experiences, we share. It is important to ask ourselves, what do we really draw on each day as we chart our course, as we do our work, as we put our situation in perspective?

This kind of background, these intellectual riches to which we are heir, is invaluable. And because it is priceless, we simply must make certain that this kind of exposure, this kind of experience, is available to future generations. That is what this commission has reflected upon.

In my experience, it has been an unusual commission in three respects. First, the diversity of its members and the extent of their involvement and engagement have been wonderful.

Second, we heard arguments that need to be heard again and again – arguments about our identity as people, about the basis for informed citizenship. We need to understand how important it is to cultivate informed citizenship in each new generation.

Third, some of the things we heard, we have not necessarily heard very often; for example, the relationship of language training and analytic ability to our national security. Or the importance of creative, innovative thinking to business enterprise. The Commission explored all of these issues and packaged them in an understandable way that we really can talk about.

From the beginning, the Commission was determined not just to produce a report that sits on the shelf. The report makes specific

recommendations, but more than that, the members of the Commission are determined to speak out, to persuade, to be advocates for the humanities and social sciences.

Thank you to everyone who has had a part in this. Please count me as part of the team to make certain that the report is disseminated widely and acted upon.



David Brooks

David Brooks is a Journalist at The New York Times. He is a member of the American Academy's Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2010.

I went to the University of Chicago, which, as some of you know, is a Baptist school where atheist professors teach Jewish students St. Thomas Aquinas. And I had, especially in the first two years, a born-again experience reading the humanities. Those were the two most important years of my life. And, to the extent that I am anything, they made me what I am.

If I were smarter, I would have realized the humanities are important at that age because they help you decide who to marry. I always tell college presidents that the most important decision their students are going to make is who to marry. Therefore, every course should be about how to make that marriage decision. We should teach the literature of marriage, the music of marriage, the neuroscience of marriage, the psychology of marriage. Nobody takes me up on that.

The real reason we were inspired in those courses was not because they would help us get a job and not because they would help make us better citizens. We were earnest eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds, and we wanted to be better people. We wanted to have better cores. We wanted to have the sorts of qualities that get talked about at a eulogy, which is not about your career but about who you *are*. We were fired by the sense that these books and these pieces of art we studied were about that. That is what attracted us to the humanities.

Now, I happen to think the humanities commit suicide when they lose touch with that internal story and try to be active in the external world. When those in the humanities become active in politics, become activist social reformers, get into the race, class, and gender business, they lose track of the core selling point of the humanities:

My hope from this Commission is that the humanities will get back to the business of what it is really about. It is not about external progress, it is not about jobs, it is not about the things outside of ourselves. It is about the things inside ourselves, and that is what is going to attract people back to the humanities.

internal improvement and internal education. What is nice about this report and the Commission's work is that we see a return to that core mission.

Christian Smith is a sociologist at Notre Dame who goes around to college campuses and asks students, "Can you name the last moral dilemma you faced?" Two-thirds of the students cannot name a moral dilemma. They say, "Oh, I pulled into a parking space, but I didn't have a quarter." And he says, "Well, that's a problem, but it's not really a

moral dilemma." It is not that the students are bad people; they just do not have the vocabulary. They have not been given the vocabulary to think about moral dilemmas, to think about the things that are most important to their core.

My hope from this Commission is that the humanities will get back to the business of what it is really about. It is not about external progress, it is not about jobs, it is not about the things outside of ourselves. It is about the things inside ourselves, and that is what is going to attract people back to the humanities.



Pauline Yu

Pauline Yu is President of the American Council of Learned Societies. She is a member of the American Academy's Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences and was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1998.

As we present our report today in the Congressional Visitors Center, we are surrounded by buildings that provide concrete evidence of why the inspiration of the humanities and social sciences is so essential to a democracy. The visitor's gallery above the chamber of the House of Representatives is lined with plaques of great lawgivers from around the world and down through the ages. They include Hammurabi, Moses, Lycurgus of Sparta, Edward I of England, Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent of the Ottoman Empire, Sir William Blackstone, and Thomas Jefferson.

The architects of the Capitol knew that humanistic learning from many places and times conveys and shapes the values of justice and democracy. More important, the architects of our Constitution drew on their

A broad education in the liberal arts and sciences, learning that liberates the imagination and creativity and fosters the relentless pursuit of inquiry, is as necessary today as it was at our nation's founding.

extensive readings of history, literature, law, political theory, psychology, and philosophy to enact the values of a bold new experiment of a democratic republic.

This republic has flourished when it follows their example. On July 2, 1862, President Lincoln signed the Morrill Act, which provided public lands to several states on the condition that the proceeds from the sale of those lands be devoted to establishing colleges and universities for "The liberal and practical education of the industrial classes, in the several pursuits of and professions in life." While the act specified that these new institutions should give scope to the agricultural and mechanical arts, it also explicitly required that the institutions offer instruction in the classics and other fields.

So we have, from the 37th Congress, acting more than 150 years ago, an affirmation that higher education is a public good and that such an education should include and embrace the panoply of knowledge.

I think the premise of our report is simple. A broad education in the liberal arts and sciences, learning that liberates the imagination and creativity and fosters the relentless pursuit of inquiry, is as necessary today as it was at our nation's founding and in the darkest hours of a bloody civil war. We offer this report to our fellow citizens and to our elected leaders as an important contribution to meeting the challenge of maintaining a vibrant democracy in a changing and increasingly interconnected world.



John Lithgow

John Lithgow is a forty-year veteran of film, television, and theater. He is a member of the American Academy's Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences and was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2010.

The thoughtful, judicious cochairs of our Commission have acted with uncharacteristic recklessness. They have chosen an actor to speak the last words of the evening. They, no doubt, hoped that I could end things with a certain theatrical flourish. Our assignment, after all, has been to generate a report on the present and future state of the humanities and social sciences in our nation. Grave and weighty subjects, indeed. And they may have figured that we should wrap it up tonight with just a touch of showbiz. Well, I will do my best.

I won't sing, and I won't dance, but I will offer some high drama. I will tear a few pages out of the screenplay of some current dystopian disaster movie and ask you to imagine America as a dark futuristic society in cosmic jeopardy, a world in need of a movie-star savior.

Imagine an America where nobody teaches and nobody learns our literature. Where Herman Melville, Walt Whitman, Willa Cather, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and James Baldwin are gradually being forgotten.

Where nobody teaches and nobody hears our music. Where Stephen Foster, Charles Ives, Louis Armstrong, Billie Holiday, and Bob Dylan are gradually being forgotten.

Where nobody teaches and nobody sees our art. Where Winslow Homer, Mary Cassatt, Edward Hopper, Jacob Lawrence, and Andy Warhol are gradually being forgotten.

Where nobody teaches and nobody learns our economic history. Where the brutal lessons of slavery, the Civil War, the Great Depression, even the financial collapse of 2008 are gradually being forgotten.

Where nobody teaches and nobody learns the history of our women, where the stories of Harriet Tubman, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Eleanor Roosevelt, Phyllis Schlafly, and Betty Friedan are gradually being forgotten.

Despite all of the unrelated issues pressing down on legislators now sitting in Congress, action on behalf of the humanities and social sciences is very definitely what is now required.

Where nobody teaches and nobody learns about other peoples. Where we conduct high-stakes diplomacy and fight misbegotten wars in countries where none of us speaks the language and none of us understands the culture.

Where nobody teaches and nobody learns about our inventors, legislators, innovators, humorists, satirists, journalists, philosophers, filmmakers, playwrights, and, dare I say, actors.

Imagine, in other words, an America where nobody teaches and nobody learns the humanities and social sciences. If we lived in such a nation, we would have to

change its name, because it would no longer be America.

Have I overstated the case? Of course I have; it's a disaster movie, it's not real. We would never allow things to reach such a sorry state. But consider the recent data on the humanities and social sciences. Though we may complacently assure ourselves that we will never descend to such a cultural dystopia, things certainly appear to be trending in that direction.

Of course, I am an optimist. All of us Commissioners are. And if our report is frank, tough-minded, and realistic, it is optimistic too. We have plenty of grounds for optimism, starting with the genesis of the Commission itself. It was created at the behest of two congressmen and two senators, one each from our two political parties. These four individuals have revealed themselves to be extraordinarily knowledgeable about our subject and committed to action. Best of all, they have stirred

a fresh breeze of bipartisanship. Anyone who heard them today and did not know their party affiliations would have found it impossible to peg them.

Let me address myself to these four gentlemen and, by extension, to all of the legislators now sitting in Congress. You have commissioned our report, and we have delivered it. We do not consider our work done by any means, but we have now passed the ball to you. We beg you to think creatively and pragmatically about what can be done to convert the words in our report into congressional action. Because, despite all of the unrelated issues pressing down on you

these days, action on behalf of the humanities and social sciences is very definitely what is now required.

And let me make one modest suggestion, *immodest* in its colossal presumption. Of the thousands of men and women who have served on Capitol Hill over the last sixty years or so, one of them has left what is arguably the most indelible mark. By chance, his legacy is in the area of the humanities and the social sciences. Through an act of Congress, this man created government grants for advanced study, sending our students abroad and bringing foreign students to our shores. Over the years, these grants have changed the lives of tens of thousands of scholars, myself among them. In the face of debilitating cutbacks in these harsh economic times, the grants continue to deliver an incalculable return on government investment. They have solidified this gentleman's place in history, making his name a household word and, not so incidentally, a common noun. This man, of course, is J. William Fulbright, senator from Arkansas.

Such single-minded leadership is called for again. The humanities and social sciences need a champion in Congress, a movie-star savior, if you will. The role is available, and we have with us tonight four major contenders. Tomorrow, to again borrow the language of Hollywood, a hero will rise! ■

© 2013 by John W. Rowe, Richard H. Brodhead, Lamar Alexander, Mark R. Warner, Tom Petri, David Price, David Brooks, Pauline Yu, and John Lithgow, respectively

Note: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry delivered a keynote address on March 18, 2013, at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the National Humanities Alliance. See page 13 for his presentation.

The humanities and social sciences are critical to a democratic society and they require our support.

Join this national conversation.

Visit www.humanitiescommission.org to:

- Download *The Heart of the Matter* report
- Watch a short film produced by Ewers Brothers Productions, LLC
- Read press coverage and op-eds
- Share your ideas
- Register for updates
- Link to important national resources
- Access data on primary and secondary education; undergraduate and graduate education; humanities research and funding; the humanities workforce; and the humanities in American public life – available through the **Humanities Indicators**.

The Humanities and Global Engagement

On March 18, 2013, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry spoke at the Annual Meeting of the National Humanities Alliance about the essential role the humanities play in preparing Americans for effective global engagement. The meeting was held at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The following is an edited version of his remarks.



Karl W. Eikenberry

Karl W. Eikenberry, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General, is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security in the Center for International Security and Cooperation, as well as a Distinguished Fellow with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, at Stanford University. He is a member of the American Academy's Commission on the Humanities and Social Sciences and was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2012.

You, the distinguished members of this audience, have devoted much of your professional careers to thinking about the humanities and advancing their cause. You know, far better than I, the intrinsic value of the humanities. Furthermore, you know

from your daily experiences the particulars of the growing crisis we are facing in schools and universities across our nation as the humanities continue to retreat to the margins of the curricula.

Therefore, I thought I could best contribute to today's discussion by moving beyond these topics, and draw from my own experience in an attempt to answer three questions. One: Why, at this point in history, are the humanities more fundamental than ever before to our country's successful global engagement? Two: How does grounding in the humanities prepare individuals for effective service in the international domain and to contribute to informed foreign policy? Three: What might be done to best advance the study and application of the humanities in our country?

In 1994, in a briefing to Congress, National Humanities Alliance Director John Hammer said,

From the NHA perspective, a significant amount of scholarly work in the humanities is of immediate value in addressing both domestic and international policy alternatives of many kinds. The humanities offer insights that contextualize and identify sources of conflict – whether they are economic, social, religious, or cultural; [they] focus on moral and ethical questions upon which all good public policy is based; and [they] illuminate the practical consequences of various strategic policy choices.

Hammer rendered this assessment almost two decades ago. The world we face and will face makes his words even more relevant and, indeed, urgent.

Consider these facts and trends:

Economics

- In 1985, U.S. nominal gross domestic product (GDP) was about one-third of the global total; today it is one-quarter and shrinking.
- In 2012, our nation's GDP was approximately seventeen times larger than it was in 1960, but the level of exports was eighty-one times higher and the level of imports 118 times higher.
- A just-published United Nations Development Programme study reports a “dramatic rebalancing of global economic power” and forecasts that the combined economic output of Brazil, China, and India will surpass that of the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy by 2020.
- China's GDP is projected to exceed that of the United States, becoming the world's largest, in 2025. If so, this will mark the first time in some 500 years that a Western power did not have the number one global economy.

Security

- Our Department of Defense and intelligence agencies generally conclude that the most serious threats to international order and U.S. security in this century are either transnational in nature (such as pandemics, terrorism, and climate change) or stem from resource scarcity (especially water and energy), or both. These are problems that inherently require multinational solutions.

Why, at this point in history, are the humanities more fundamental than ever before to our country's successful global engagement?

- Given our nation's budget realities, America's future application of military force will increasingly be contingent upon the participation of coalition allies, giving currency to the expression attributed, perhaps apocryphally, to Sir Winston Churchill: "Gentlemen, we have run out of money. So now we must think."

Politics and Diplomacy

- Over just the past few years, we have experienced the Arab Spring, the Saffron Revolution, and steadily rising popular discontent with the failures of capitalist market economies to satisfactorily address the age-old problem of socioeconomic inequality.
- Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping says he is a man with a dream, which he calls "the China Dream," only defined at this juncture by its collectivist juxtaposition to the individualistic-oriented "American Dream." His stated ambition is to lead a renaissance of his country and culture so that China can resume, as he says, "its rightful place in the world."

Based on these global developments and trends, political philosophers and scientists, historians, anthropologists, linguists, theologians, sociologists, regional specialists, and, I expect, most others in the humanities and social sciences can rest assured that the previously announced end of history has been temporarily postponed. You can safely anticipate at least another century of very productive full employment.

During the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency made a mock travel poster that included a dramatic photo from Mos-

cow's Red Square depicting a menacing Red Army tank formation participating in the annual May Day parade. The caption read, "The Soviet Union – come visit us, before we visit you."

I can imagine that such a poster updated to address today's world might feature a photomontage of global political activists, scientists, entrepreneurs, traders, soldiers, students, religious leaders, farmers, and the like, with the caption beneath proclaiming, "The World – come visit us, before you become irrelevant."

It is clear that we need a strong cadre of Americans in our government, military, business, civil society, academe, and beyond who have the right skills and experiences to help America stay connected with the world and shape outcomes that secure our national interests.

How then does grounding in the humanities prepare individuals for effective service on the international stage, and how can appropriate application of the humanities contribute to better global engagement?

History

Like all of you, I can count on one hand my really significant lifetime mentors and deep sources of inspiration. My short list includes Professor Jay Luvaas, who taught me advanced military history when I was a cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

One day, as I was wearying of studies, preparing for graduation, and anticipating my first field assignment in the Republic of Korea, I asked Professor Luvaas how his lectures might help me in the years ahead when confronted with a specific tactical problem far from his classroom.

He replied, "Well, Cadet Eikenberry, the answer to your rather specific question is, 'not much.' The military profession is both art and science, and in this class we study art."

Professor Luvaas, though, went on to say,

Karl, let me suggest one of many things that hopefully you can take with you from this course. You can take perspective and context. In the coming years you may be called upon to lead soldiers in combat.

I know of no more demanding, stressful, or lonely task. But remember, no matter how difficult the situation you may face, commanders over the millennia have been there before you . . . Xenophon's 10,000, Wellington's troops at Waterloo, Grant's army at Vicksburg.

Different technologies, geography, weather, missions, and odds – but one constant for military leaders at all levels – they were under severe stress and felt extraordinary loneliness. And yet, they often survived and found ways to prevail. Historically speaking at least, you will never be alone.

Jay Luvaas became one of my life's spiritual companions. Whether serving as a platoon leader entrusted with forty infantrymen in Korea, commanding the coalition forces in Afghanistan, or even heading the United States embassy as our ambassador in Kabul, I remembered Professor Luvaas's words whenever things got tough. He was always there to offer perspective and context.

From personal experience I can say that we ignore the study of history at our own peril. When asked to name the greatest deficiency in formulating our strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade, my reply is always, "The absence of rigorous thinking in time, as Richard Neustadt would have said."

The historical perspective and context can help moor ambition and help distin-

guish the transient ripple from the rhythmic tide. They can help put hubris in check.

I am not suggesting that having historians at the table would have led to better policy choices in Iraq and Afghanistan, but after more than eleven years of war, trillions of dollars of expenditures, and many lives lost and terribly damaged, it is hard to imagine how the appropriate application of the discipline of history to policy formulation could have made things worse.

Archaeology and Museums

Over the course of my years of service in Afghanistan, the two most cost-effective U.S.-sponsored projects I can think of are the restoration of the great Citadel of Herat at one of the gates to Persia – Qala Iktyaruddin – whose origins date back to the time of Alexander the Great; and the renovation of the National Museum of Afghanistan in Kabul, which included putting in place a wonderful exhibit of artifacts from the pre-Islamic Gandhara Buddhist civilization that flourished in Afghanistan during the times of the later Roman and early Byzantine empires.

These efforts, priced in the few millions of dollars, not the tens and hundreds of millions associated with massive reconstruction projects, equipping and training security forces, and conducting military operations, paid two remarkable dividends.

First, they offered the people of Afghanistan, traumatized by decades of conflict and chaos, evidence of a rich culture and prior days of glory. With displays that included both some facts and some myths, the Herat Citadel and National Museum of Afghanistan are part of the foundation on which a more stable and prosperous Afghanistan must be built. They have made and will make incredible contributions to the promotion of national unity.

To stand on their head the words of the infamous Nazi playwright Hanns Johst, one

might hopefully say, “When I hear the word *gun*, I reach for my culture.”

Second, these two projects serve as good American legacy. The Afghan people, when they see the restored Herat Citadel and revitalized National Museum of Afghanistan, catch a glimpse of an America that has been, in parts of the world, obscured quite literally by the fog of war attending many military interventions.

From personal experience I can say that we ignore the study of history at our own peril. . . . The historical perspective and context can help moor ambition and help distinguish the transient ripple from the rhythmic tide. They can help put hubris in check.

As Chief of Mission in Kabul, over time I came to regard our embassy’s cultural heritage program manager – aka, embassy archaeology specialist – as one of the most high-impact members on our team. She was also one of only two archaeologists to be found in any U.S. embassy around the world.

Music

In 2009, when I was ambassador, we made some modest contributions to the start-up Afghanistan National Institute of Music in Kabul, which provides instruction in Western and traditional Afghan music to youth, regardless of means. Two months ago I attended a concert performed by the Institute’s orchestra here in Washington at the Kennedy Performing Arts Center.

The event turned out to be one of the most powerful and emotional musical concerts I have ever attended. The sense of pride engendered among the many Afghan nationals and Afghan-Americans who attended was overwhelming.

No one in the audience left the Kennedy Center that evening with a definitive answer

to the question of how Afghanistan will fare after the drawdown of U.S. and NATO military forces over the next eighteen months. Yet everyone in the audience could leave certain that the Afghan people, given the right environment, can and will excel on the world stage (no pun intended).

I visited Singapore recently and met with an old friend, the very worldly (and, to my mind, wise) Ambassador Tommy

Koh. I don’t think he would object to me disclosing a relevant point from our conversation.

Given my background with government and military service, I asked him the predictable question, “How can the United States improve its standing in Singapore and Southeast Asia?”

I expected him to dig into details about the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement or the specifics of future U.S. military deployments in the region. His answer was unexpected.

He simply said, “Send the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.”

The meaning was clear. It was not really about the Philharmonic-Symphony Society of New York, as it is properly called, or even exclusively about music. His point was about deploying (sorry for the military terminology) “soft power.”

Victor Hugo wrote, “Music expresses that which cannot be said and on which it is impossible to be silent.” I take music as representative of the humanities and agree with Hugo – what the humanities offer

often cannot be verbally expressed but must not be left silent. America's historic advocacy of the humanities is a great source of international appeal, and we retreat from this advocacy at great cost.

The Study of Languages

In the fall of 2002, I arrived in Kabul on my first tour of duty in Afghanistan. Eager to rapidly learn as much as I could about the country and the people, I met with many Afghans and asked them about their history, culture, and customs.

One evening, I hosted General Asifi, then commander of the Afghan Border Police. Both of us relied on my very good Dari interpreter, the young Dr. Najib. The general went on at length about the famous traditions of the Afghan people. He was clearly proud of their renown as excellent hosts. Asifi became more animated, as did my interpreter in his effort to convey my guest's enthusiasm.

What the humanities offer often cannot be verbally expressed but must not be left silent. America's historic advocacy of the humanities is a great source of international appeal, and we retreat from this advocacy at great cost.

Dr. Najib translated the general's culminating sentence as, "We Afghans have a long and glorious history of inviting foreigners to our country and then hospitalizing them."

Now, I think Dr. Najib got it wrong in this instance, and the proper translation should have been, ". . . and then showing them great hospitality." But the fact that I am not absolutely sure more than ten years later demonstrates the importance of language.

At a superficial level, this story is about the importance of accurate translations. But at another level, it demonstrates the critical

ancillary skills associated with proficiency in one or more foreign languages.

I believe that those who speak a foreign language with some degree of competency learn the art of carefully listening to others, an art that escapes many Americans abroad who specialize only in transmission. General Asifi was genuinely grateful to share a meal with an American Army general who listened.

Those who master foreign languages are also much more sensitive to the clarity of verbal communications, even when working through an interpreter in a language they do not understand. Even more important, they are better attuned to cross-cultural communications.

When I was a student at Nanjing University, a professor explained to me that if I spoke no Chinese, I would be a window-shopper admiring the goods on display from the street. If I went further and learned the language, I would be able to

enter the store and look around. But if I went even beyond this and learned the culture as well – made accessible, in part, through the portal of foreign language sensitivity – I would be invited by the shop owner into the back room to see the store's real treasures.

I submit that the surprise that attended the suddenness and scope of the Arab Spring indicates a need to have greater numbers serving in government and relevant policy circles who are capable of going beyond metaphorical window-shopping. However,

only the humanities and social sciences – enabled in part by language competency – can give one entrée and access to the store.

How might we promote humanities research and education? Here are three modest suggestions.

First, make the humanities more relevant to contemporary problems – not only in the universities but (and this is perhaps even more important) in K-12 and continuing education programs.

In his classic *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides says much about the conflict between Athens and Sparta, about so-called rising and status quo powers. I have seen articles by learned American authors in recent years that cast Sino-American relations as being governed by the "Thucydides Trap."

Perhaps. However, the historical analogy is not entirely apt. China and the United States are integrated into a common world economic order (albeit imperfectly), whereas Athens and Sparta maintained separate trading systems, the Delian League and the Peloponnesian League. Nor, for that matter, did Athens run huge trade surpluses with Sparta and maintain large amounts of Spartan treasury notes.

Why not conclude a study of the *History of the Peloponnesian War* by assigning essays on contemporary Sino-American interaction, and then have students argue over how Thucydides himself would see parallels and divides between his own account of the Athenian-Spartan rivalry and the anticipated trajectory of U.S.-China relations?

An appreciation of the humanities is acquired through long practice and study, but demonstration of the humanities current relevance through association can serve as a powerful catalyst.

Second, I encourage all of you in the humanities to engage in important debates over public policy when you have something to say – which should be often. I am

not sure your voices are adequately heard. In military terms, I am afraid you are at times AWOL (or absent without leave).

For instance, I mentioned earlier the increasing popular dissatisfaction in many parts of the world with the failing of market economies to provide sufficient equality of opportunity, variously argued as equality of outcome.

Every week, I read op-eds by distinguished economists who debate the degree to which economic or socioeconomic inequality exists in our country and who then go on to speculate on causes, consequences, and cures.

I do not see the same degree of engagement from relevant disciplines within the humanities. Had the Gini coefficient, formulated in 1912, been popularized several centuries earlier, would Rousseau have been content to reduce his arguments on inequality to the need to achieve a national Gini index of below 0.25?

Those of you in the humanities need to reclaim your space in many of the great public debates of the times. This argument relates, of course, to my first suggestion about establishing contemporary relevance.

Third, and last, inspire your students to explore the humanities.

As I approached the end of my sophomore year at West Point, I resolved to drop Mandarin Chinese, having completed the two years of mandatory foreign language studies at the Academy. I very much enjoyed my Chinese language classes and was making good grades, but they were consuming much study time. I was concerned because I was soon to face a heavy load of science and engineering courses in my junior year.

My Chinese language professor, Mr. Jason Chang (along with Professor Luvaas, he was one of the few civilian instructors at West Point at that time), learned of my decision and called me to his office to persuade me to reconsider.

Those who speak a foreign language with some degree of competency learn the art of carefully listening to others. . . . Those who master foreign languages are much more sensitive to the clarity of verbal communications. . . . Even more important, they are better attuned to cross-cultural communications.

He said, “Mr. Eikenberry, you need to participate in the Chinese Language Club’s trip to Taiwan this summer before you decide.”

A very wise nineteen-year-old, I told him I had made up my mind and that while joining the trip would be interesting, it would be a waste of resources.

He persisted and I reluctantly agreed.

So at the age of nineteen, off I went to the Republic of China, as we called it then. During the trip, I enjoyed:

- Mandarin classes at the prestigious State Department Language School at Taichung;
- exotic dinners in language instructors’ homes;
- training with Chinese cadets at the Military Academy at Kaohsiung;
- driving up the east coast of Taiwan to Hualien and visiting Taroko Gorge;
- flying to the offshore island of Quemoy (or Kinmen) and listening as Nationalist Army forces and the People’s Liberation Army (contending with the Cultural Revolution at the time) exchanged propaganda insults over loudspeakers;
- walking the night market of Taipei.

All are still vivid memories. When I returned to West Point in the fall of 1971, I told Professor Chang to sign me up for two more years of Chinese language classes. Two more years then seamlessly became a

lifetime avocation. Professor Chang knew his mark well.

As those of you in the humanities discuss the critical and inescapable need for support for the humanities, never forget the role of inspiration in exciting the next generation, so that the torch can be passed to them. I urge all of you to be Professor Chang. ■

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The Benefit of Public Investment in Higher Education: California and Beyond

On January 28, 2013, the Academy honored Robert J. Birgeneau, Chancellor Emeritus of the University of California, Berkeley, at a special symposium on the benefit of public investment in higher education. Chancellor Birgeneau, University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman, and Dean of the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley Henry E. Brady participated in a conversation on the future of America's system of public higher education, focusing on the California model and beyond. The program also included an introduction by Robert D. Haas, Chairman Emeritus and former President and Chief Executive Officer of Levi Strauss & Co. The symposium, held at the University of California, Berkeley, served as the Academy's 1993rd Stated Meeting. The following is an edited transcript of the presentations.

We find ourselves faced with an astounding inversion in our sources of support. Public disinvestment in higher education threatens our university and every other public higher education institution in California.

– Robert J. Birgeneau,
Chancellor Emeritus and Professor of Physics
and Professor of Materials Science and Engineering,
University of California, Berkeley



Robert D. Haas

Robert D. Haas is Chairman Emeritus and former President and Chief Executive Officer of Levi Strauss & Co. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2011.

Introduction

We meet today to discuss the future of American public higher education and to honor one of its exemplary leaders, the chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, Robert J. Birgeneau. The story of American public higher education is one of constancy and change; it began in 1862, when President Abraham Lincoln signed the Morrill Act, which sought to prepare a wide segment of the population for employment in an increasingly industrialized nation and to expand access to the broad liberal education that had long been the exclusive province of America's elites. That foresighted act fueled the growth of a vast network of state-based universities that, along with their private peers, makes American higher education the worldwide standard for excellence in higher education.


Until recently, states have understood the value of having a broadly and well-educated citizenry and have generously funded public higher education. Nowhere has that been more evident than in California, with its much-envied three-tier system of university, state, and community colleges. However, the viability of publicly funded higher education in this country has been challenged in recent years by sharp cutbacks in state funding. While federal research funds and tuition aid have somewhat buffered the decline, the fact is that publicly supported institutions, which educate 75 percent of college-enrolled students in this country, are in jeopardy.

Just as the financial model that fueled public higher education is undergoing dramatic change, so, too, are the demographics of many of these institutions. The building we are meeting in is symbolic of that change. Opened in 1902 and now called the Faculty Club, for many years it was informally known as the Men's Faculty Club, because in the early days of this campus men predominated on the faculty and women were not admitted to the members' dining room, lounge, and recreation areas, except on special occasions. Similarly, the student body was largely white, male, and drawn from the ranks of the upper and middle income. That continued to be the case 50 years ago, when I was an undergraduate on this campus.

Currently, however, this campus, and those of many other public universities, is reflecting shifts in our culture and demographics. In my day, over 60 percent of my classmates were male, and 90 percent were white. Today, the majority of undergraduates are women, 52 percent, and roughly a third is white. While over 90 percent of my classmates came from families where both parents were born in the United States, today 71 percent of freshmen have at least one parent born outside the United States, and 27 percent come from families where

neither parent has a four-year college degree. Seventy percent of the student body receives some form of financial aid, and 38 percent receives federal Pell grants, meaning that their family income is less than \$45,000 a year. This campus has as many Pell grant recipients as all eight Ivy League schools combined.

Chancellor Birgeneau, in whose honor the American Academy of Arts and Sciences has convened today's symposium, has been in the forefront of envisioning a new model that will enable American public higher education to continue to play the distinctive and viable role of providing both access and excellence to a large swath of America's population. Moreover, as the statistics I have just cited show, Berkeley is opening the door of educational opportunity to able, hardworking students who represent the future, not the past, of our country.



Robert J. Birgeneau

Robert J. Birgeneau is Chancellor Emeritus of the University of California, Berkeley. He also holds faculty appointments in the Departments of Physics and Materials Science and Engineering. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1987.

Presentation

I am going to present some data that I think will help frame the discussion and define what the challenge has been and continues to be for us at the University of California, Berkeley (see Figure 1). When I started as chancellor in 2004, we received \$451 million from the state and \$310 million from our generous alumni, endowment earnings, and other sources of income, not including student fees and research funding. Student fees, in their entirety for the university at that time, contributed \$247 million, approximately half of what we received from the state. (These figures are in real dollars, not adjusted for inflation.) Our research funding, close to \$500 million, was already quite significant in 2003 – 2004.

We have been able to create a financial aid system throughout the entire University of California that guarantees that no California resident student whose family income is under \$80,000, and who is eligible for financial aid, pays any tuition at all.

When Bob Dynes, then President of the University of California, recruited me here from MIT via the presidency of the University of Toronto, he said that we were entering a terrific time at the university because he had negotiated a compact with Governor Schwarzenegger that would keep funding stable for one year, then increase it by 4 percent each year for three years, and then by 5 percent each year after that. If the compact with the governor had held, our state support in 2011 – 2012 would have been close to \$600 million. Accordingly, I started out as chancellor imagining that we would be able to create many new programs based on

a future income of \$600 million from the State of California. It did not quite work out that way, to say the least!

Instead, state support in 2011 – 2012 shrank to \$269 million – less than half of the \$600 million that the Schwarzenegger compact had promised. Actually, the current situation is worse than that because \$27 million goes to support the services we receive from the Office of the President of the University of California. In addition, we lose another \$6 million of our financial aid that is redirected by the President’s office to other UC campuses. Hence, the actual funding from the state that ends up on the




Figure 1

Berkeley campus is under \$240 million, a far cry from my expectations in 2004.

Gifts and other forms of income have increased remarkably – by \$270 million to \$580 million in 2011 – 2012. That is the result of a combination of a dramatic increase in philanthropy – our philanthropy has gone up by about \$200 million a year – and better investment of our funds. Gifts and other income have gone from being a secondary part of our total budget to being one of the most significant contributors.

The most dramatic increase has been in the total income from student fees, which has risen from \$247 million in 2003 – 2004 to \$624 million in 2011 – 2012 (this includes all undergraduate and graduate fees). Our research volume has also increased dramatically, from \$500 million to close to \$700 million. Another \$100 million is funded by the U.S. Department of Energy through the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, so the total research volume on campus in fact approaches \$800 million.

If you hold my kind of position in California, every once in a while your telephone rings and Jerry Brown, governor of California, is on the line. That happened today, and I had a 20-minute conversation with the governor. The good news is that he is engaged in a way no governor has been in the recent past. The bad news is he thinks that we can operate more efficiently and that some of our faculty do not teach enough. I think that I corrected some of his misunderstandings, but we will see. He also raised questions about the balance between research and teaching. Because I know the governor well personally, I said to him, “You provide us \$240 million a year and our research provides us \$800 million a year. If you were in charge, how would you strike the balance?” I think that he understood the conundrum that we now find ourselves in with the ever diminishing state support of public education.




Figure 2

We find ourselves faced with an astounding inversion in our sources of support. Public disinvestment in higher education threatens our university and every other public higher education institution in California. We here at Berkeley have been able to cope with this inversion better than most institutions have. If you are, for example, at one of the newer campuses, your research funding is limited and your income from gifts and other sources is similarly limited. Accordingly, you find yourself in a much more precarious situation than we do here at Berkeley.

What has this meant for our student body, for our undergraduates? When I began as chancellor, there were 20,500 Berkeley undergraduates who were California residents. We let that number drift up, which was a financial mistake that, among other things, led to seriously impacted classes,

simply because the number of students was increasing while the funding was going down. At the peak of our enrollment of California students, only about half of our undergraduate students who were California residents were funded by the state. Consequently, we decided to decrease the number of California residents that we were admitting to our undergraduate programs and return to a more sustainable target of about 20,500 for California residents.

We also decided – first for educational reasons, then for financial reasons – to increase dramatically the number of out-of-state and international students, a trend that is now progressing rapidly (see Figure 2). In 2007 – 2008, 8 percent of our students were out-of-state or international. Today 17 percent are, and we expect that in 2013 – 2014 this percentage will approach 20 percent. Twenty percent is our current target, but

A large percentage of our student body is made up of extraordinarily talented students from low-income families. This defines our university as a public university better than any other statistic that I might cite.

that figure is not written in law or in stone. My successor and the community (the faculty, etc.) will have to decide whether 20 percent is the appropriate asymptote for the number of out-of-state and international undergraduate students or, if there is further disinvestment by the state, should that percentage go higher.

What about income distribution? With state funding being decimated and student fees more than doubling, one might think that this would have led to a hollowing-out of low-income students. In fact, this has not happened at all. Here we do have to give

credit to the state government for maintaining the Cal Grant program, which provides significant financial aid to students from low-income families. As student fees have gone up, the state funding for Cal Grants has increased proportionally. As a result, we have been able to create a financial aid system throughout the entire University of California that guarantees that no California resident student whose family income is under \$80,000, and who is eligible for financial aid, pays any tuition at all.

Interpreting data concerning the family income distribution of our students is com-

plicated, because historically there are significant variations in the number of students actually reporting family income. Nevertheless, if we look at our lowest income students alone, namely, those with a family income of \$0 to \$40,000, we see that the number of low-income students has stayed nearly constant since 2000 (see Figure 3). This is a miracle, one of which we are extremely proud.

In the next cohort group, those with family incomes of \$40,000 to \$80,000, the number of undergraduate students has gone down slightly, by only a few percentage points. Among the cohort of students from really privileged families, those whose family income is above \$200,000, the number of undergraduate students has risen gradually from 5 percent of our student body to about 8 percent. However, we do not know how much of that increase comes from the increasing number of people reporting their family income.

So, despite the state's disinvestment, the character of the student body has not changed at Berkeley over this past decade. A large percentage of our student body is made up of extraordinarily talented students from low-income families. This defines our university as a public university better than any other statistic that I might cite. I once heard Berkeley described as "Harvard for the masses"; that may well be true, and we are very proud of it. Ten percent of our students come from affluent families, and if you set the threshold at a family income above \$140,000, that figure jumps to 22 percent. We have a robust percentage from the middle class, and 45 percent of our students come from families whose incomes are sufficiently low that their students pay zero tuition, making a Berkeley education free for them. I think that is an astounding accomplishment.

What about the ethnic composition of our student body? The data have been relatively constant over the last decade and a half, in spite of almost heroic efforts by

UC Berkeley Undergraduate Students by Income Group, 2000-2012




Figure 3

**UC Berkeley CA Resident Undergraduate Students
by Race/Ethnicity, 2000-2012**




Figure 4

our admissions staff and by staff in student affairs to increase significantly the number of underrepresented minorities. In general, our undergraduate student body is quite diverse in terms of gender, religion, race, sexual preference, and economics, but much work still remains to be done.

One characteristic that differentiates schools in California from those in the rest of the country is that our state has no majority population. The one group that has increased significantly in our student body is the Chicano-Latino population, which has gone from just over 10 percent to 15 percent of our student body and is rising gradually, reflecting the progressive increase in

the number of Chicano-Latino young people in the state of California.

Asians have been constant at 43 percent, Caucasians, on average, at 31 percent. The Native American and African American populations have also been constant. For “other/decline to state” groups, the number has dropped by a factor of two, from 11 percent to 5 percent (see Figure 4). So, in spite of everything that has happened over this past decade, the ethnic distribution in our undergraduate body has essentially remained constant. This is a really interesting phenomenon, one that we need to understand better.



Mary Sue Coleman

Mary Sue Coleman is President of the University of Michigan, and she also holds appointments as Professor of Biological Chemistry in the Medical School and Professor of Chemistry in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. She was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2001.

Presentation

A year ago this month, Barack Obama came to our Michigan campus to discuss the issue that is front and center for university presidents and for him: the cost of a college education. We were nervous when he told us he was going to visit, because I could see another beating-up of universities for charging too much: “You have to get your costs under control.”

So we spent a lot of time, in the few days before he came, with the Domestic Policy Council – many of whom are UM alums – telling them about the complicated way in which university finances are based. The point is, the old compact is broken. We need a new understanding and new partnerships,

American higher education is unparalleled. Students from around the globe know that there is great value in coming here. But we have an obligation to deliver quality and affordability.

because it is important that these great universities remain in the future.

We all know that American higher education is unparalleled. Students from around the globe want to come here. We have many more students who want to come to Michigan than we can possibly accept. The same is true at Berkeley. The consumers of what we offer know that there is great value in coming here. But we have an obligation to deliver quality and affordability. We understand that.

In my first year at Michigan in 2002, state support was \$359 million. Last year it was \$268 million. But we don’t have Cal Grants. In fact, we now have no state support for scholarships. And, if you factor in inflation, funding from the state now equals our appropriation in 1964, when Lyndon Johnson was president and Barack Obama was a toddler.

We are in crisis. I don’t use that word often or lightly, but when one of our national assets is under threat, it is a true crisis.

I believe solutions exist, but they require thinking and action from all of us. First, I have not given up on state governments. We need to make the case to state governments so that they can give more support to universities. Today in Michigan, as in California, we spend \$2 billion a year on incarceration. We spend \$1.3 billion on higher education. And that is a pretty sad statistic.

I also believe that the business community needs to deepen its support, because we need other people telling our story, explaining why higher education is a good investment for the public. I am very fortunate in Michigan, where the state’s

business leaders have finally begun to see the problem. They need college graduates for their companies to prosper, so they are beginning to see higher education as being an interest of theirs.

The economic landscape in Michigan is changing dramatically, much more than in California. We have gone, in the last decades, from union jobs in the auto industry that paid well and required only a high school diploma, to technology-oriented positions that demand at least an associate’s degree, if not more. Business leaders in Michigan have estimated that in seven years our state will need 900,000 workers with more than a high school diploma. Today only about 25 percent of Michigan’s citizens have bachelor’s degrees. This is well below the national average, so we are not prepared for the future. As a consequence, state CEOs are pushing the state to restore a billion dollars to higher education funding over the next decade. If done over a decade, the strain on the state is not large and would get us back, at least partly, to where we were before. We cannot afford an uneducated workforce, but we will have one if the state does not reinvest.

As public universities, we have to look more to private support. Philanthropy has always been a cornerstone of private universities, but only recently have the publics begun to follow suit. We need to be frank with our students about this. When my son started at Williams – this was many years ago – my husband and I went to a convocation at which the president of the college talked about the students’ obligation to give back, and to give back every year, because

they were so privileged to be there. We don't do that as much as we should at the Michigans and the Berkeleys of the world, but I think we have to. And it works, as you have found at Berkeley.

When I challenged Michigan alumni to fund need-based scholarships in our last campaign for undergraduates, they responded with another \$70 million on top of the \$540 million they had already given to support students in our capital campaign. At the same time, though, we have to continue to build financial support in the next capital campaign.

We can guarantee, for in-state families, that if their son or daughter can get into Michigan, we will put a financial aid package together to make it possible to attend. We cannot make the same guarantee for out-of-state students, and now 40 percent of our entering class is from out-of-state.

In the last decade, our tuition increase has averaged just a little more than 5 percent a year, while state support has declined by more than 50 percent. Our actual cost to educate students has increased by only 2.3 percent, which is less than the CPI, primarily because we have been so effective in cutting costs. However, we have not been able to make up that whole gap created by loss of state support in cutting cost. We have had to increase tuition to offset the dramatic cut in state support, and to provide more need-based financial aid.

This is hard, painful work. But it is something we have to do, and it is a continuing challenge to our campus community. But we are committed to providing an affordable education, because all of us benefit from an educated citizenry. Last month, at our December commencement we said goodbye to the last class of 2012, which arrived

and to the nation. In 2017, we will have the opportunity to reflect on Michigan's legacy as we celebrate our bicentennial. We have done much to shape public higher education in this country, and we are going to use our bicentennial celebration to reflect on our institution's impact and to explore ways we can shape society in our third century. This is a conversation that the country needs to have, and I am so grateful that the American Academy is engaging in The Lincoln Project to advance a national conversation about public higher education and the important role public colleges and universities play for our future and for the country as a whole.

The business community needs to deepen its support, because we need other people telling our story, explaining why higher education is a good investment for the public.

We have gone further than Berkeley here, but for a long time we have had more out-of-state students than Berkeley. This may in part be because of a decline in Michigan's demographics. The number of high school seniors is dropping dramatically in the state.

Finally, universities have an obligation to cut costs. At Michigan, for the last decade, we have had a heavy focus on cutting costs. Since 2003, we have cut our general-fund cost by \$235 million. This represents an almost 15 percent cut in ongoing expenses. We are now working to identify another \$120 million in savings by 2017 so that this work will go on forever.

on campus just weeks before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. From a financial perspective, those four years were discouraging. But I find that young people are an optimistic lot. We know from research that Michigan students want to give back to society. They are particularly committed to building a sustainable world, improving schools, and stabilizing the economy. They leave college with a strong appreciation for diversity and all of its benefits, which will serve them well as they take on many paths in life.

The great public universities of this country have been doing this kind of work for a long time. We educate young people, we build leaders, and we contribute to the state



Henry E. Brady

Henry E. Brady is Dean of the Goldman School of Public Policy and Class of 1941 Monroe Deutsch Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2003.

Presentation

Accessible public higher education provides equal opportunity and gives people a chance to make the best of themselves. Somewhat surprisingly, that turns out to be important from the perspective of economic efficiency. Denying a lot of very bright, hardworking young people the chance to go to the very best university they can attend is, as the United Negro College Fund (now UNCF) has said, a terrible waste of bright young minds. So making it possible for people of all socio-economic and demographic backgrounds to come to the University of California, Berkeley – people who are eager to learn, who want to work hard, who have intelligence, and who merit coming to Berkeley – increases economic

Evidence shows that where there are higher educational institutions, there is higher economic growth, greater productivity, more creativity, more innovation.

efficiency and produces more economic development and more growth. The UC system helps build a stronger State of California and a stronger nation.

Equal opportunity is not just a nice thing. As well as being a basic American value, it is also just good common business sense to put money into higher education. Chancellor Birgeneau has been a leader in showing how important this investment is, and he has also always been optimistic about the future of Berkeley and higher education because he ardently believes that California and America will not turn its back on education. He has the same kind of optimism and confidence about

the future that FDR showed during the Great Depression and World War II. With Bob at the helm, you always have the sense that we are going to make it through, that we are going to find a way, and that things will get better. We *are* going to solve our problems. The truth is, we have already solved some of them, and we are in a much better place than we were four years ago, when disaster struck the American economy, state budgets, and the University of California.

But is public higher education worth preserving? What are the benefits of public investment in higher education? Some people say, “Why don’t we just privatize




Figure 1

everything? Education is a private good. Individuals get benefits from it. Let them pay the cost, and let them get the education they can afford to have.” Is this a wise idea?

Let us start at the beginning by asking about the value of higher education. Is it really worthwhile for anybody? A lot of evidence shows that where there are higher educational institutions, there is higher economic growth, greater productivity, more creativity, more innovation. An overwhelming body of economic research shows that one of the most important things you can invest in is education and higher education. Without question, education and higher education are important. And investment in higher education does not mean redistribution from one area of a country to the area where the higher educational institution is located. The growth rate of the entire economy increases through investment in higher education.

Californians with a college degree will earn \$1.3 million more and will spend less time in poverty over their lifetimes than their peers with only a high school diploma.

How does higher education do this? Well, through the same processes on which we evaluate our faculty: through research, service, and teaching.

Many studies show that R&D is fundamentally important for the economic health of the American economy and that, if anything, we are underinvesting in R&D in America right now, both in the private and public sectors. We need to invest more.

The services provided by a university such as the University of California or the University of Michigan are also important for the areas in which they are situated.

Universities provide services to state governments and nonprofits. They help businesses, and they help the arts. And although we don’t have as much data as I would like to see in this area, I am convinced that public universities do all sorts of things that make the places in which they are located better places to live and work.

Universities also invest in human capital. We teach. We take people, give them knowledge, and make them more able to get good jobs while increasing the productivity and economic growth of a society. In some sense, this argument for higher education is the hardest one to make, because at least some people will say, with some justification, that “Oh, well, that’s a private good. Individuals just benefit from that. They should pay for it themselves.”

Higher education *is* certainly worthwhile to individual students. In a study I did about the payoff of California higher education systems with Michael Hout and Jon Stiles, we found that Californians with a college degree will earn \$1.3 million more and will spend less time in poverty over their lifetimes than their peers with only a high school diploma. More education provides for more earnings and higher total income (see Figure 1).

Furthermore, we found that this outcome is not simply because the people who go to college have high ability and therefore would have done well no matter what. It turns out there is a value added to higher education. We actually teach people something; we do something useful. Not only is there a substantial payoff to higher education, the gap in lifetime earnings between




Figure 2

those who complete college and those who do not go to college has been increasing (see Figure 2). Income for individuals with less than a high school degree has been declining over time relative to high school graduates, and lifetime earnings for those with college degrees have been increasing relative to high school graduates. This is true for all ethnic groups. The benefit of getting a college degree is real, and that benefit has been increasing over time.

Next we looked at the benefits of higher education to the state. The state wins in two ways when people go to college: (1) it gets more in taxes because people earn more money; and (2) the state has lower expenditures because fewer people commit crimes or need cash aid. We found that the number of years a person is in poverty, unemployed, on cash aid, or in prison decreases dramati-

For college completers, for every dollar the state invests in higher education, it gets \$4.80 back.

cally as he or she gets more education (see Figure 3). That is good for the state.

For college completers, for every dollar the state invests in higher education, it gets \$4.80 back. Higher education is an incredible investment for the State of California, one the state should engage in to a greater degree. The investment not only benefits individual students, but it provides public goods in the form of safer streets, less welfare, and a healthier population.

Research also shows that people who have gone to college are more tolerant, are better citizens, and are more engaged. They know more about the world. They are even happier. There are lots of reasons for people

to go to college, making higher education a mixed private and public good.

In addition, higher education, when properly constructed, can be an engine of upward mobility. We should not tell people whose parents did not go to college or those who do not have much money that they cannot go to college. We should say, “If you performed well in high school, and if you look like you have what it takes, you can come to Berkeley.” My father was a carpet salesman. He did not go to college. My mother was enrolled in college for one year. Going to college is the reason I am here today. I am proud to be part of a university that allows people to have that same opportunity.

“But,” some might ask, “is public investment actually needed? Maybe the public should not be getting involved here because private individuals could still make the right choices.” Actually, we have lots of reasons to believe they won’t. First, funding higher education has benefits that go beyond what the individual can get for him- or herself, so people will under-invest in education if left to a purely personal decision. Second, people without much wealth may not want to make the risky investment of going to college, which is expensive with uncertain payoffs. So we need some way to give people that opportunity without asking them to make risky decisions that they might find too daunting. Some people argue that this can be done through better private sector loan markets, but because of the risk that is involved and the peculiarities of human capital, standard capital markets are an imperfect mechanism for matching people with the loans they need to attend college. One of the major problems is that of collateral – unlike most loans in which the assets produced by the loan serve as partial




Figure 3

collateral, we cannot ask people to make their human capital collateral for their loan because it would require some form of indentured servitude for those who do not pay off their loans. That is why we have federal government loan programs.

Finally, teenagers do not always make the right choices about going to college. We may want to make it easier and cheaper for them to go to college, because that way they will be more likely to make the right choices when education is subsidized. When my twin brother was about 20 years old, he decided the important thing for him to do was to work at Douglas Aircraft in Long Beach, make a lot of money, and buy a Chevrolet Camaro 396, which provided immediate gratifications, unlike investing in college. The car was red; it was beautiful. He let me drive it once in a while, and I loved that car. But it wasn't really a good use of his resources, and it wasn't a good decision on his part. In the end, he graduated from Cal State Long Beach, served in the Peace Corps, and went on to be a star high school teacher in Southern California. He has been a great contributor to society, but he had a little detour there with the Camaro. A lot of students do, some of whom do not find their way back.

So public investment may be needed, but why fund higher education institutions directly? Maybe we just need Pell grants. Maybe we just need Cal Grants. Maybe we should subsidize individuals directly and let them make the decisions. Some economists think this is the right choice. I think it is wrong because it does not solve some important problems. First, it is not clear that the private sector can provide enough high quality higher education. One of the great things that happened in California is that the California State University and University of California systems have increased the overall supply of higher education in California beyond what the private sector

would have provided. Second, it is also not clear whether the private sector can match the quality of education provided by the UC and CSU systems, and whether it would have the same public mission and commitment to equal opportunity.

Finally, believe it or not, economic research suggests that the elite *private* non-profit higher education sector is often less efficient at delivering higher education than the public sector. This is not what they believe on Wall Street or in the pages of the *Wall Street Journal*. But a lot of evidence suggests it is true. Why? In part it is because public universities face very tough budget constraints. Public universities cannot simply say, "Oh, let's just use a little more of the endowment for a while to smooth out what we are doing." They can't raise another billion dollars in contributions. Because it is much harder for public universities to do these things and because they face periodic budget cuts and public scrutiny, public sector institutions of higher education are often much more efficient than those in the elite private, nonprofit sector – a miracle of miracles and another strong argument in favor of public investment in institutions of higher education like UC Berkeley and the University of Michigan. ■

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The Arab Spring: What Next?

On March 13, 2013, the Academy hosted a panel discussion on “The Arab Spring: What Next?” **Philip S. Khoury** (Associate Provost and Ford International Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), **Malika Zeghal** (Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Professor in Contemporary Islamic Thought and Life at Harvard University), **Tarek Masoud** (Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School), and **E. Roger Owen** (A. J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University) described components of the Arab Spring, focusing on Tunisia, Egypt, and the eastern part of the Arab world. The panel discussion served as the Academy’s 1995th Stated Meeting. The following is an edited transcript of the discussion.

The Arab regimes used the repressive arm of the state to beat back all challengers. In so doing, they systematically denied most of their citizens their basic human rights and dignity, and in the process they helped to create deeply disturbed societies.

*– Philip S. Khoury, Associate Provost and
Ford International Professor of History
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology*



Philip S. Khoury

Philip S. Khoury is Associate Provost and Ford International Professor of History at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002.

Introduction

Because the Arab Spring is still a work in progress, all we can do is explain how it got to where it is today and then try to peer a bit into the future. But there is no science of prediction, at least when it comes to the Middle East. I am a historian, and you know what they say about historians: we have enough trouble predicting the past, let alone the future.

How were so many Arab regimes able to impose their authority over their citizens for four decades? Those autocrats who had oil wealth used it to purchase the social peace. Others adopted neoliberal economic policies to attract Western foreign aid and used this aid in part to bind certain elites to their regimes through various forms of crony capitalism. And the regimes all used

Historians will be debating for years to come the question of why the uprisings did not occur much earlier than just two years ago. That such highly unpopular regimes could successfully impose decades of relative stability over such deeply disturbed societies is a paradox.

the repressive arm of the state to beat back all challengers. In so doing, they systematically denied most of their citizens their basic human rights and dignity, and in the process they helped to create deeply disturbed societies.

Their failure to create significant prosperity for the many, even as they steadily unfastened the social safety nets counted on by the many, contributed to the eruptions that began in December 2010. Mounting demographic pressures and escalating food prices also worked against these regimes. Sixty percent of the Arab world is under the age of 30, and young people suffer the highest rates of unemployment. Some of these same young people went to the streets in Tunis and Cairo and elsewhere.

Still, historians will be debating for years to come the question of why the uprisings did not occur much earlier than just two years ago. That such highly unpopular regimes could successfully impose decades of relative stability over such deeply disturbed societies is a paradox.¹

What observations can we make about these uprisings, these revolutions, the likes of which have not been witnessed anywhere since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East-bloc regimes more than two decades ago? First, they were not ignited by the military or by foreign interventions.

¹ Albert Hourani first mentioned this paradox in *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

Nor were they led by revolutionaries with a clear vision or program.² They were led by young, educated, mainly secular, urban, middle-class elements, who employed a language that spoke of a profound need to assert human dignity. By rising up, they were announcing to their rulers and to the world that they had had enough.

Second, Islamic organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood joined the protests late. The Islamists waited to see which way the winds were blowing and then jumped in. They appear to be reaping the benefits of uprisings and revolutions they did not initiate.

Third, while the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were not particularly violent, and both regimes fell quickly thanks to the army's support of the protestors, the uprisings that came after quickly became very violent and took, or are taking, much longer to resolve, at least with regard to ousting their dictators. I am thinking, of course, of Libya, and we are all watching Syria.

UCLA historian James Gelvin has conveniently grouped the Arab Spring into four categories, or types.³ The first grouping is Tunisia and Egypt. Both had armies that

² See Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "The Arab Counterrevolution," *New York Review of Books*, September 29, 2011.

³ James Gelvin, "Conclusion: The Arab World at the Intersection of the National and Transnational," in Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, eds., *The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2013), 238–255.

were able to step into crisis situations without fragmenting, and in the process they helped to oust Ben Ali and Mubarak. Once these leaders were removed, both countries saw Islamist parties with quite similar dispositions come to power in basically free elections.

The second grouping is Yemen and Libya. Here, both regimes fragmented. Some of the army, some of the ranking government officials, and some of the tribes stood by the regime, while others from these same elements joined the opposition. Neither had unified armies, and their autocrats had not built up sufficiently strong institutions, preferring to run the state as personal fiefdoms. The overthrow of the Libyan leader Gaddafi, in October 2011, would have taken even longer had it not been for NATO's air strikes.

The Arab future will not be decided by those who launched the Arab Spring. The secular, liberal, young people who first rose up and who demonstrated tremendous courage in challenging the legitimacy of their autocratic regimes do not have the organizational strength and influence to contend with the Islamists.

The third grouping is Syria and Bahrain. They are family regimes that exploit ties of religious sect and kinship to reinforce their rule. The Alawite minority in Syria, which includes the Assad family, is an esoteric sect associated with Shiite Islam. The Alawites prop up the Assad regime. Meanwhile, the Syrian rebels are mainly Sunni Arabs, who are a majority in that country. The longer the Syrian uprising continues, the more it is becoming a sectarian civil war between Sunni rebels and the Alawite-backed Assad regime.

In Bahrain, Shiites are actually the majority, but they are also less economically advantaged than the Sunni minority, and

they have the deepest grievances against the monarchy. The monarchy is an extended family, bound by kinship ties, and it is Sunni. To ensure that the Bahraini monarchy did not fall and possibly trigger a wave of protests across the Gulf region, military forces from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates rushed to the monarchy's rescue and crushed the dissident movement, at least for a while.

In the fourth grouping of Arab countries, which are all monarchies, protestors pressed for reforms rather than the overthrow of their leaders. These countries are Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman. Why have the Arab monarchies fared considerably better than the Arab republics? For some, vast oil wealth is buy-

ing time. But others do not have that kind of wealth, in particular Morocco and Jordan, and Jordan may be particularly vulnerable.

Perhaps the monarchies have not faced the kind of uprisings that the Arab republics have because they can claim a dynastic or religious legitimacy that the republics cannot similarly claim. I am not prepared to say, however, that some of the oil-rich Gulf countries will not face problems similar to what Bahrain is facing. One should watch Kuwait in particular.

The Arab future will not be decided by those who launched the Arab Spring. This is now clear. The secular, liberal, young people who first rose up and who demonstrated tre-

mendous courage in challenging the legitimacy of their autocratic regimes do not have the organizational strength and influence to contend with the Islamists.

And, let's face it, the language and creed of the Islamists are very attractive to large numbers in the Arab world. The Islamists spent two generations honing their skills and developing their programs under repressive regimes; so they have had extensive experience in opposition. But the Islamist parties that have won elections since the uprisings have had almost no experience in governing. They may understand social welfare, but their knowledge of modern economics is flimsy at best.

Still, the Islamist parties that have won the highest offices in the land will now do everything they can to retain those offices, whatever the price. They do face challengers, however, one of which is the military. The army may be back in its barracks now, but it has the power to intervene in the event of long-term instability or if it feels that its financial interests are in jeopardy. In Egypt, the military is truly corporate and controls about a third of the formal economy.

Another challenger is what is being called, for want of a better term, the "Arab Street." Tahrir Squares now exist all over the Arab world, where large protests occur almost daily. These permanent protestors are a mishmash of shifting coalitions, of secular liberals, Islamists, religious minorities, women's and labor organizations, and others. And while they are hardly unified, they are accusing the Islamic parties now in control of the highest government offices of trying to subvert the democratic processes that have been introduced these past two years.

The Arab Street has become an increasingly loud voice after 40 years of haunting silence – and not only in Tunisia and Egypt. One can see the Street at work in Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and elsewhere.

The third challenger the Islamic ruling parties face comes from within their own ranks. I refer to the more militant, more purist, less-compromising Islamic elements who are already nipping at their heels. These elements are mainly associated with the Salafis. The internal struggle among Islamists is already playing out in Cairo and Tunis, and we can also see it within the rebel movements fighting to unseat the Assad regime in Syria. The longer the Islamic parties manage to control government, the more likely they will be to consolidate their rule, a new kind of authoritarian rule, at the expense of most challengers.

On Syria: Everyone is watching the Syrian civil war unfold. In two years, in a country of 23 million, more than 70,000 have been killed – that is the equivalent of nearly 1 million Americans. The conflict has already generated more than 2 million internal refugees, and nearly a million more refugees have flooded into neighboring countries, including as many as 400,000 into fragile Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the middle classes and the Christian minorities are fleeing in droves from Syria, and the battle for Damascus is just beginning. Why is Syria so critical? Because events in that country could cause, and are already causing, perturbations in Syria's immediate neighbors. Meanwhile Iran is witnessing the demise of its closest ally in the Arab world, the Assad regime.

In simple terms, a proxy war is taking place. On one side, we have Iran, along with Russia, supporting the Alawite-backed Assad regime, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar assist the rebels who are trying to topple the regime, and Washington comes down on their side. The longer the civil war continues, the better the chance that the more militant Islamic forces will gain the upper hand in the hotly contested struggles among the Syrian opposition for who will one day replace the Assad regime.

Speculation is growing that Syria could collapse into three or four separate enclaves, but I doubt any could survive economically for long. Israel is watching Syria very closely, in case the regime starts using its chemical weapons. Israel is also tracking Hezbollah's movements in Lebanon. Hezbollah is the radical Lebanese Shiite party that has gone head-to-head militarily with Israel in the past. The Syrian regime has been the funnel through which Iranian weapons and aid reach Hezbollah in Lebanon, so Hezbollah's fate is tied to Assad's.

If the Syrian regime topples, Hezbollah could become quiet, go underground for a while. Or, in an act of desperation, it might try to take over the Lebanese government militarily, which would likely provoke Israel. At the least, Hezbollah will become increasingly involved in the armed skirmishes between pro-Syrian Lebanese factions and the Lebanese aligned with the Syrian rebels. Add the enormous refugee problem to the mix, and Lebanon could possibly begin to unravel as it did during the long civil war of the 1970s and 1980s.

Meanwhile, the Turks are nervously engaged because they want to make sure the Syrian Kurdish minority on Turkey's borders does not cause disruptions that spill over into Turkey and arouse its own disenfranchised Kurdish minority. Turkey wants to influence whatever replaces the Assad regime when it collapses.

Finally, the Obama administration, so far, has refused to encourage the delivery of major weapons systems to the Syrian rebels because it worries that they may fall into the hands of those extremist rebel forces most committed to terrorism. In late February we started to provide funding for so-called nonlethal aid, medical supplies, and food, and Washington may well be supporting the training of Syrian rebels in Jordan. Washington would like to persuade the Russians to back a transitional government through

the United Nations Security Council but so far there has not been much traction there.

The United States is generally facing a reduction in its ability to influence events and trends in the Arab world. We have lost our allies in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, and we have not really gained new ones in those places, though we are working at it. U.S. policy will continue to focus on finding ways to stabilize the region so as to ensure the flow of oil and to prevent regional warfare between the usual and the not-so-usual suspects.

Washington's leverage has been diminished, and Mr. Obama apparently has learned from Afghanistan and Iraq that, if we are not careful, Syria could suck us into a situation from which we may not be able to extract ourselves anytime soon. Washington will continue to escalate its diplomatic initiatives, with the aim of trying to ensure that when the Assad regime tumbles it does not tumble into the wrong hands.

Whether our administration will also undertake substantive new initiatives toward a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is something we will all be watching closely as Mr. Obama prepares to go to Israel later this month. But I would not be too hopeful.



Malika Zeghal

Malika Zeghal is Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Professor in Contemporary Islamic Thought and Life at Harvard University.

Presentation

What has been called the Arab Spring started in Tunisia in December 2010. Massive uprisings led to the fall of that country’s authoritarian president, Ben Ali, in less than a month, to the surprise of Tunisians and the entire world. The uprisings expressed a demand for economic rights and, in particular, the right to access the job market in the context of a grim economic situation.

After the global financial crisis of 2008, unemployment reached its highest levels in the center-west and center-north of the country, the poorest regions of Tunisia. In that sense, the Arab Spring started with a massive movement of protest against deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and worsening regional inequalities, rather than as a movement for democracy.

Since then, the economic conditions that led to the start of the Arab Spring have

Even though we cannot speak of a true revolution – the main structures of the old regime and society are still in place – two transformative mini-revolutions occurred in Tunisia: first, political pluralism and freedom of expression; second, the replacement of the secularist elites by the Islamist elites.

not improved and have perhaps worsened. Unemployment of graduates today hovers around 33 percent, and inflation is at about 6 percent, making social unrest an everyday staple of post–Ben Ali politics.

On the other hand, even though in the winter of 2010 Tunisian demonstrators did not unite around the desire for democracy, the political institutions and landscape have been greatly transformed since then. Although the state administration did not collapse either during or after the December 2010 uprisings, the void at the helm of the state and the constant pressure of the street led to a political transition, during which political pluralism was established and a Constituent Assembly was democratically elected in a context of unprecedented freedom of speech.

The elections led to a renewal of the governing elites. The Islamists of the Renaissance Party obtained about 40 percent of the seats, while the secular center and left were fragmented, and the populist party called Al Aridha came in second. The previous secularist governing elite was replaced by a new generation of Islamists, who, returning from exile, prison, or a long retreat from political life, found themselves suddenly governing

the country, but with no prior experience of state governance.

Even though we cannot speak of a true revolution – the main structures of the old regime and society are still in place – two transformative mini-revolutions occurred in Tunisia: first, political pluralism and freedom of expression; second, the




Figure 1. Tunisia: The Islamist Vote (Nahdha Party) in the October 23, 2011 Election

replacement of the secularist elites by the Islamist elites.

Islam – particularly, political Islam – has always been an object of anxiety for secularists in the Middle East and for Western analysts and commentators. They often ask whether an Islamist electoral victory will prevent a democratic transition and, more broadly, whether Islamists are truly committed to democracy. While I cannot respond to these questions this evening with the time imparted to me, I can attempt to answer the following question: Who voted for the Islamist party in Tunisia?

Before the Arab Spring, determining the constituency of Islamists in the Middle East was difficult because elections took place in

First, the Islamists are present almost everywhere and are particularly strong in urban areas: in the populated urban peripheries and, to a lesser extent, in the urban centers of the country, the capital, the coast, and the urban centers of the south.

Merging the electoral results with social-demographic indicators shows that the Islamist vote correlates with literacy and secondary education, as well as with indicators of average living standards for Tunisia. This means that the vote for the Islamists comes from the middle and upper middle class and the educated. On the whole, no correlation is visible between unemployment and the vote for the Islamist party.

The Islamist party obtained the lowest fraction of the vote in Sidi Bouzid, the cradle

important divide that separates the ruling elite – by which I mean the Islamists and the secularists, who, in fact, resemble one another very much – from the poorest regions of Tunisia in the center-west, where illiteracy and unemployment are high, where turnout at the elections was low, and where the Islamist party and the center-left parties are weakest.

The next battle in Tunisia will not be about the role of Islam in the state or about the commitment of political actors to democracy, although these questions remain at the center of the Tunisian public debate. The Tunisian political class – at least so far – seems to be committed to a democratic transition. The problem is elsewhere.

As shown by the sad story of a young street vendor from Jendouba in northwest Tunisia who on March 12 set himself on fire in the capital Tunis, in a gesture reminiscent of the spark that started the Tunisian revolution, the next battle is about the future of economic development and of the regions whose people live in poverty and illiteracy. The political future of Tunisia hinges on the outcome of this battle.

The next battle in Tunisia will not be about the role of Islam in the state or about the commitment of political actors to democracy, although these questions remain at the center of the Tunisian public debate. . . . The next battle is about the future of economic development and of the regions whose people live in poverty and illiteracy.

an authoritarian context and results likely did not reflect the state of public opinion. Nonetheless, in 2010, my colleague and friend Tarek Masoud analyzed the Egyptian Muslim Brothers' 2005 electoral strategy and inferred that they had chosen to focus on an affluent constituency.

In Tunisia, the elections of October 2011, which were free and fair, according to Tunisian and international observers, allow us to describe more clearly the Islamist constituency and to reflect on the political and religious cleavages in Tunisia. The general electoral results of October 2011 show several things of importance (see Figure 1).

of the revolution, the district in which protests originated with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010. This region at the center of the country is one of Tunisia's poorest districts, with one of the highest unemployment and illiteracy rates. This speaks to a crucial line of political cleavage that is often ignored.

Analysts of Tunisia often focus on the divide separating the Islamists from the secularists at the risk of ignoring an important class cleavage. The Islamist/secularist divide is an ideological one that, in Tunisia, is overwhelming the political debate. But it is also obstructing a more



Tarek Masoud

Tarek Masoud is Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School.

Presentation

I have been asked to describe what happened and where things are likely to go in Egypt. This is a hard assignment, not just because of the breadth of the topic but because the one thing political scientists have proven empirically is that we have no predictive power whatsoever.

Views of the Arab Spring and its aftermath, particularly in Egypt, veer between one of two extremes. On the one hand, we have a kind of sunny optimism, and on the other hand we have an unremitting, remorseless pessimism. The optimism appeared early in the writings on the revolution, when the crowds first gathered in Tunisia in December 2010 and then in Egypt in January 2011.

When the gathering crowds actually led to the flight of long-standing dictators, it was impossible not to be optimistic, maybe even euphoric, about the changes that were

under way, especially since the crowds that unseated those dictators did not appear to be made up of the bearded Islamists we had long been told, usually by Mubarak and Ben Ali, would be the ones who would inherit the post-authoritarian order. Instead, the protests seemed to be led by photogenic, Western-educated, Western-oriented young people who appeared to desire what the West desired for them: freedom, liberty, democracy, economic development.

The giddy spirit of that period is captured in a statement President Obama made during the height of the protest that

mosque. In reality, the military and the Islamists, between them, negotiated and set the course of the transition.

Rapid elections, held from November 2011 to January 2012, were one of the key elements of that transition. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party won about 47 percent of the seats. Coming in second was al-Nour, a Salafist party that appeared out of nowhere, having never engaged in political activity before. Six months later, in a closely fought, two-round election, the Muslim Brotherhood's candidate, Mohamed Morsi, eked out a victory over a bemedaled general named Ahmed Shafik.

In December 2012 the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies were able to enact a constitution that the secular opposition leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, described as violating freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and the independence of the judiciary.

unseated Mubarak. When the president was asked by somebody on his staff what he hoped for in Egypt, he reportedly said, "What I want is for the kids on the street to win and for the Google guy to become president." The "Google guy" is Wael Ghonim, a Google executive who also maintained a webpage that was one of the organizing centers of the protest.

Given what happened next, the president's statement seems remarkably naive. As we know, the photogenic liberals, including the Google guy, were unceremoniously rushed off the stage, to be replaced by two groups that were very distant from the kind of media darlings that had captured Western attention: Mubarak's military and the Islamists.

This was not surprising. The revolutionaries' Twitter and Facebook technologies proved no match for the much older and much more tested technologies of gun and

In December 2012 the Brotherhood and its allies were able to enact a constitution that the secular opposition leader, Mohamed ElBaradei, described as violating freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and the independence of the judiciary. Among the hallmarks of Egypt's new constitution are the removal of long-standing guarantees of equality for women and an enhanced role for the country's religious authorities in the legislative process.

Once all of this happened, the tone of writing on Egypt's revolution shifted from optimism to tremendous pessimism. And many of us began to remember our modernization theory, which posits a link between development and democracy. During our cheerleading of the revolutions we had conveniently forgotten – but now suddenly remembered – the work of people like Seymour Martin Lipset, who told us that

democracy requires an educated and literate citizenry.

The illiteracy rate in Egypt is 35 percent. The United States hasn't had an illiteracy rate that high since about the Civil War. New England hasn't had an illiteracy rate that high since the beginning of the eighteenth century.

So you could be forgiven for being pessimistic about the possibility that these people can sustain democracy. However, I reject that kind of argument. Still, every time I go to the Middle East to collect data (I run surveys in Egypt), I keep getting data that I don't want to see.

Some of the data reveal that Egypt's citizens really do have very illiberal preferences. In a survey I did in November 2011 of 1,600 Egyptians, 67 percent disapproved of the idea of having a female president. Okay, you might say that's not unusual. Thirty percent, though, believed that women were unsuited for any public position whatsoever. Eighty percent believed that the government should set up a council of religious scholars to vet laws to ensure that they conform to the Sharia, which is essentially what has happened. And 75 percent approved of the idea that religious authorities should be allowed to censor the media.

You might be thinking, Egypt does not have a tremendous constituency for liberalism. However, one does not need to go all the way with the modernization theorists or even believe that democracy requires a liberal citizenry to find reasons for pessimism. (I doubt the Bill of Rights could pass in a referendum in the United States today.) Political scientist Adam Przeworski and his colleagues surveyed cases of democratic breakdown and identified a threshold of wealth above which democracies tend to be durable – which is the level of wealth enjoyed by Argentina on the eve of the 1976 coup that unseated Isabel Perón.

Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, and several other Arab countries are poorer today than Argentina was when its democracy failed in 1976. Lebanon, Libya, and the oil-rich states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are much richer, but their wealth

The best hope for Egyptian democracy can be found in the tremendous protest and unrest and contention we see in almost every square in Egypt.

comes from oil, which has its own, well-documented democracy-retarding effects. The fundamental intuition here is that the poorer a country is, the greater the percentage of its citizenry who might accept an abrogation of democracy. In the 1950s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser abrogated what little democracy Egypt had, the poor supported his coup because, in their view, democracy had not delivered. That we could see such a thing again is not unlikely.

The reasons for pessimism pile on. In November 2012, President Mohamed Morsi seemed poised to undo Egypt's entire democratic experiment when he arrogated to himself the right to issue decrees that were above any kind of judicial review.

He was forced to step back from that precipice, but many people thought the episode spoke to a fundamental illiberalism and disrespect for constitutional procedure among the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, when the Islamist-drafted constitution was passed, it included a clause that banned from political life all those who had been elected to parliament under the former ruling National Democratic Party's banner in the last 10 years. Many people interpreted this as an attempt to skew the playing field in the Brotherhood's favor.


Is there an exit from this situation in which Egypt now finds itself? I think so.

Just as I think that the early optimism surrounding the Arab Spring was maybe insufficiently attentive to the challenges of establishing democracy, so, too, do I think that this unremitting pessimism that now hangs over us is blind to the country's still

considerable democratic possibilities. We know that the grim predictions of economic determinants are belied in poor democracies like Indonesia and India, so might Egypt be able to defy those predictions, too?

At the risk of sounding Panglossian, I think Egypt can, and I think the best hope for Egyptian democracy can be found in the tremendous protest and unrest and contention we see in almost every square in Egypt. In early March 2013, the *New York Times* editorial page chided Morsi and the Egyptian opposition for not achieving consensus to solve the country's problems. But what Egypt has now is more essential to the well-functioning of democracy than consensus. What it now has is opposition.

Note: Egypt was in a state of unrest as this issue of the Bulletin went to press.



E. Roger Owen

E. Roger Owen is A. J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2007.

Presentation

One of the basic differences between the eastern and the western parts of the Arab world is that the western part contains relatively homogenous populations with long histories of state systems and constitutions, whereas the eastern part is much more confused and divided. If we can find a structure here, it comes from two historical developments.

One is a kind of sectarian geography, whereby the eastern part of the Arab world was ruled for a long time by Sunni Muslim dynasties but contained what were often heretical minority communities. These communities took refuge in two mountains, one just west of Beirut and another in northern Iraq. The Middle East is now ruled by dynasties that grew up in these mountain districts and were

In Syria and Bahrain, the governments felt sufficiently threatened by the Arab Spring and its possibilities that they chose to resist. Both countries have entrenched dynasties that are convinced they will disappear if the popular movements are allowed to work their way through the system.

essentially opposed to the Sunni rulers of the plains, but then infiltrated major parts of the Middle East.

The second development is that after the First World War, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed after having ruled this part of the world for 300 years, the French and the British divided the area into something called Iraq, something called Syria, something called Lebanon, something called Jordan, and something called Palestine, each of which has some kind of historical *raison d'être* but was also, in some sense, a new and artificial enterprise.

We are dealing here with states that have had only a recent history of government, although they do represent a sense of something that one might call “Syrianness” or “Iraqiness.” Syrians, for example, speak Arabic in a different kind of way, they tell different jokes, they have a different kind of cooking, and so on.

Nevertheless, the eastern half of the Arab world is not an area that can be said to have settled down. Some people, including Tom Friedman, have even called for a return to the Sykes-Picot Agreement and a review of the ways in which this part of the Arab world was carved up.

Although the Arab Spring was present in the eastern part of the Arab world, it was met there by a variety of responses. Those states that had sufficient money sought to buy off their populations by providing jobs and welfare – in the way of Saudi Arabia – and that largely worked.

But in two important places – Syria and Bahrain – the governments felt sufficiently threatened by the Arab Spring and its possibilities that they chose to resist. Both countries have entrenched dynasties that are convinced they will disappear if the popular movements are allowed to work their way through the system. So, they are digging in.

In Bahrain we have a longtime, indigenous insurrection among the Shia majority against the Sunni rulers. The ruling family is divided, but the hard-liners decided – stupidly, I think – that the Arab Spring should not be allowed to overflow into Bahrain.

Bahrain, which is a major port for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, has become a major embarrassment to the United States. The Bahraini government now faces daily, concerted pressure to settle its internal differences. Policy-makers fear that if the Syrian regime falls, its major ally, Iran, may start to make trouble in Bahrain and other places.

The Syrian government, in its rather myopic way, was surprised by the peaceful popular protests that began to take place every Friday, willing to consider reform but only from a position of strength. Then, as Ramadan approached in 2011, it was faced with the possibility of daily protests, because that is the nature of Ramadan. Everybody goes to prayer in the evening.

So the regime decided to dig in and meet peaceful protests with a violent response. Since then, the confrontation has been extended, with the regime using its powerful arsenal. Syria has an extremely effective

air force equipped with Russian planes; it has tanks and missiles. The opposition has extended and developed guerrilla tactics and is waging a hit-and-run campaign against the regular forces.

That is roughly where we are at the moment: the Syrian government is in power in certain parts of the country, having surrendered other parts to a variety of militias, some of them religiously motivated, all of them funded by friends in the Gulf and elsewhere who feel that the Assad regime is an unsatisfactory regime for a Sunni Arab country. But the various groups are hardly connected. No real government-in-exile has close connections to those inside.

So we have money and fighters from various sources, and, as a recent article in the *London Review of Books* illustrates, starting

the hands of anybody in Syria, because they would reduce command of the air.

But the balance is slowly shifting. Some surface-to-air missiles seem to be getting in, in particular a Russian variant of the Stinger. Stingers were used to enormous effect in Afghanistan. They were regarded as so dangerous by the United States that it kept a log of every Stinger that had ever been produced and went around the world trying to get them back into safe hands. Anyone who has the strength to point something into the air can use a Stinger – it is a heat-seeking weapon – to bring down helicopters and, in some cases, aircraft. They are very dangerous.

The situation now is a stalemate. Washington, London, and probably everybody else assumes that the Assad regime must fall at some stage, but nobody knows exactly

The endgame is how you move from the present confusion through the fall of the Assad regime to a government that can maintain some kind of structure, some kind of law and order, and permit the refugees – over a million – to return to their homes.

a battalion is quite easy. All that is needed are tough guys – and everybody in Iraq and Syria is a tough guy – and guns. Thanks to the rulers in Iraq and Syria, who made no effort to disarm their populations, guns, in the form of AK-47s, are everywhere.

So almost anybody can start a militia, send pictures by cell phone to well-meaning people in the Gulf, receive financial support, and send in requests for bigger weapons. But the type and number of such weapons to come in has been limited. The one thing the rebels desperately need is Stingers and surface-to-air missiles to bring down Syrian air force planes and helicopters. Until recently, the United States and the Israelis were particularly concerned with preventing these weapons getting into

when that will be. Instead we hear considerable discussion about what the endgame might be. The discussion has two aims: somehow or other to preserve a Syrian state structure that can be used to govern the country; and to deal with the refugee crisis – that is, to get the refugees back. The endgame is how you move from the present confusion through the fall of the Assad regime to a government that can maintain some kind of structure, some kind of law and order, and permit the refugees – over a million – to return to their homes. ■

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The Third Wave of Immigration

On April 18, 2013, Douglas S. Massey (Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University) and Jorge Castañeda (Global Distinguished Professor of Politics and Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University and former Foreign Minister of Mexico) described the current state of U.S. immigration policy. The discussion served as the Academy's 1996th Stated Meeting. The presentations and the introduction given by Mary C. Waters (M. E. Zukerman Professor of Sociology at Harvard University) follow.

The massive militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border had significant effects on migrants' behavior. Migrants looked for ways to minimize the increasing costs and risk associated with crossing the border. They did so not by staying home but by hunkering down once they had come into the United States. They did not want to repeatedly bear the risks and costs of crossing the border without authorization. So, the net effect of our militarization of the border was not to deter people from coming, but to stop them from going home.

– Douglas S. Massey,
Henry G. Bryant Professor
of Sociology and Public Affairs,
Princeton University



Mary C. Waters

Mary C. Waters is M. E. Zukerman Professor of Sociology at Harvard University. She was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2006.

Introduction

The topic of our discussion tonight, and also of the Summer 2013 issue of *Dædalus*, is immigration. Although it has been a news topic for decades, immigration has received a lot of attention recently, and we may be about to see some real movement on the issue. Many of us who study immigration are busy digesting the 800-page legislative proposal that has been put forth by the so-called Gang of Eight senators, who have been trying to fix our immigration policy.

Almost everyone agrees that our current policy is broken, but there is disagreement about how it is broken and how to fix it. Americans are ambivalent about immigration. They have always been warm toward immigrants when they think about their own parents and grandparents or their friends and neighbors. But when they think

We now have 11 million undocumented people in the United States. That is about equal to the number of African Americans who lived under Jim Crow in the South prior to the civil rights movement. The undocumented have virtually no rights, they live in the shadows, yet they are very much a part of our society.

about immigrants as people different from themselves, they get quite worried.

Right now that ambivalence is targeted toward our southern border. Throughout America we are seeing a virulent new nativism that disparages immigrants from Latin America – most especially those from Mexico.

We now have 11 million undocumented people in the United States. That is about equal to the number of African Americans who lived under Jim Crow in the South prior to the civil rights movement. The undocumented have virtually no rights, they live in the shadows, yet they are very much a part of our society.

Among them, the most poignant group is the so-called Dreamers. These are people who came to the United States as children and are now highly assimilated Americans. But they face a cliff when they graduate from high school and realize they cannot find employment, cannot get a driver's license, and they cannot be a full adult in the only society they have ever known.

Most people do not know that under the Obama administration there has been an alarming rise in deportations. Four hundred thousand people have been deported yearly, taken from their families. Some are sent back to a country whose language they do not speak.

If we want to understand immigration policy, how it got to its present position and where it is going in the future, we could not ask for anyone better than the two experts who will speak with us tonight.

Douglas Massey is a sociologist who has studied racial segregation and immigration in American cities, and he has been the director of the Mexican Migration Project, which is one of the main ways we know about what is actually happening with Mexican migration in the United States. He is the past president of the American Sociological Association and the Population Association of America, and is the current president of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. He is the author, most recently, of *Brokered Boundaries: Constructing Immigration Identity in Anti-immigrant Times* and *Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System*. He is also the guest editor of the Summer 2013 issue of *Dædalus* on "Immigration & the Future of America."

Jorge Castañeda is the Global Distinguished Professor of Politics and Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University. He is a political scientist, a public intellectual, and a prolific author who has written about Mexican society. He was the Foreign Minister of Mexico from 2000 to 2003. In that position, he focused on diverse issues in U.S.-Mexican relations. He is the author, most recently, of the book *Ex-Mex: From Migrants to Immigrants*, and he is a regular columnist for a number of publications, including the Mexican daily *Reforma* and *Newsweek International*.



Douglas S. Massey

*Douglas S. Massey is the Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1995 and is guest editor of the Summer 2013 issue of *Dædalus* on "Immigration & the Future of America."*

How did we get into this mess? Before 1965, the United States had no numerical limits on immigration from any country in the Western Hemisphere, and we had a sizable guest worker program with Mexico. Thanks to the Bracero Program – a binational, bilateral agreement reached with Mexico in 1942 – we had, by the late 1950s, around 450,000 Mexicans coming in every year on guest worker permits. Also at this time, some 50,000 permanent resident aliens were entering from Mexico.

So, roughly a half-million Mexicans were entering the United States every year in the late 1950s. Ninety percent of these individuals were circulating in and out on temporary work visas, and about 10 per-

The rise of undocumented migration created a chain reaction of migration policies in response. We put more and more restrictions on immigration, more and more emphasis on border control, more and more emphasis on enforcement.

cent were entering with permanent visas. But even among that 10 percent, many were circulating back and forth. The flow was substantially circular.

Then, starting in the 1960s, the U.S. Congress began to ratchet down the number of guest worker visas and in 1965, for laudable reasons as part of a civil rights initiative, decided to purge the U.S. immigration system of its racist heritage.

Congress eliminated discriminatory national-origin quotas, replacing them with a system that allocated roughly 20,000 visas per year to each country. The visas were to be distributed according to family and labor market criteria.

That is all well and good, but Congress, in its infinite wisdom, also imposed the first ever limitations on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. No thought was given to what this might mean for Mexico, what effect it might have on an ongoing immigration system. I doubt that the members of Congress even knew there was an ongoing immigration system. If you listen to the testimony from 1965, you will hear little commentary about what might happen in the Western Hemisphere. Congress was worried about Asians, about blacks, about Italians coming in. Nobody was thinking about Latin America.

Nonetheless, in 1965, Congress imposed a 120,000-person-per-year cap on the hemisphere. Over the subsequent decade, the cap was ratcheted down until, by 1976, the Western Hemisphere was brought under the 20,000-per-country-per-year cap. At the

same time, in 1964–1965, Congress unilaterally cancelled the guest worker program. In the context of the civil rights movement, the program was seen as an exploitive labor program, something akin to Southern sharecropping – which, of course, it was.

But what Congress set in motion was a new future: mass undocumented migration. By the mid-1960s, the flows from Mexico to the United States were well-established. The Mexicans knew their employers, and the employers knew their migrants. Well-developed migrant networks linked communities in Mexico to worksites and neighborhoods throughout the western United States and Chicago.

When the opportunities for legal migration and legal entry were suddenly eliminated, the flows did not stop. The conditions on the ground had not changed: there was still a demand for workers. Hundreds of thousands of Mexicans were connected to employers in the United States. And so, over the next five to ten years, the flow simply resumed – only now it was undocumented. By 1977, roughly 500,000 Mexicans were again entering the United States every year. Now, however, 80 percent of them were undocumented.

The rise of undocumented migration created a chain reaction of migration policies in response. We put more and more restrictions on immigration, more and more emphasis on border control, more and more emphasis on enforcement, and all of the efforts simply backfired, producing the worst of all possible worlds.

As undocumented migration rose, political entrepreneurs and ambitious bureaucrats were able to frame migration as a threat to the United States. Because these people were illegal, they were, by definition, a threat. They were criminals, lawbreakers. This is the motif you see throughout the media today, but it began in the 1960s and came to a peak around 1979, about the time that apprehensions in the United States reached a peak as well.

The flow of undocumented migrants actually stabilized after the mid-1970s. But, because of the trope of illegality, more resources are thrown at border enforcement. The Border Patrol's budget goes up, and more Border Patrol officers are hired. What happens when more patrol officers with bigger budgets are looking for immigrants crossing the border? Apprehensions rise.

Rising apprehensions were taken as proof that the invasion was continuing. We needed *more* border enforcement. The cycle became self-feeding: throwing money at the Border Patrol produced more apprehension, and increased apprehensions justified more funds for the Border Patrol.

Even though the number of attempted undocumented crossings had stabilized in the late 1970s, apprehensions shot up exponentially from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, when Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which granted legal status to about three million undocumented immigrants.

The IRCA also began a two-decade process of border militarization, a massive expansion of our enforcement capacity that was unconnected to the underlying realities at the border. The number of people coming in had not changed; they were just coming in with a different status.

The massive militarization of the Mexico-U.S. border had significant effects on migrants' behavior. Migrants, being

reasonable people, looked for ways to minimize the increasing costs and risk associated with crossing the border. They did so not by staying home but by hunkering down once they had come into the United States. They did not want to repeatedly bear the risks and costs of crossing the border without authorization. So, the net effect of our militarization of the border was not to deter people from coming, but to stop them from going home.

What changed from 1985 to 2005 was not the inflow, but rather the outflow. In demography, we have a simple equation called the balance equation: net migration equals in-migration minus out-migration. If in-migration stays more or less the same but out-migration plummets, net migration increases. We have been spending \$3–4 billion a year militarizing the border only to double the net rate of undocumented migration in the United States.

As undocumented migration rose, political entrepreneurs and ambitious bureaucrats were able to frame migration as a threat to the United States. Because these people were illegal, they were, by definition, a threat.

Initial border enforcement efforts were heavily concentrated in California, making that border almost impermeable. So what happened? The migrants crossed somewhere else. As flows were diverted through Arizona, that state, which had been a backwater, suddenly became a hotbed of migration. Arizona had not seen significant Mexican immigration since the 1920s, but now, after the 1990s, a majority of Mexicans were coming through the state, giving Sheriff Arpaio his big moment in the sun.

Within ten years, what had once been a circular flow of male workers going to three

states—California, Texas, and Illinois—became a national population of settled families. We doubled the net rate of undocumented population growth and created a settled population.

This is the origin of today's 11 million undocumented people. Basically, we trapped Mexican workers who before had been circulating back and forth across the border on the U.S. side of the line. As they stayed longer, they brought their families. As they brought their wives, they had kids. They were not coming across to have anchor babies. They were coming across to reunite, and people in their twenties end up having kids. Things ballooned out of control, leading to our current predicament.

I believe we are nearing a crossroads and are at a hinge point in American history, especially with respect to immigration.

The current status quo is that undocumented immigration has dropped to a net of

zero, or at least to very low levels; it might have picked up a bit in the past year, but we do not yet have the statistics to say for sure. We do know that from 2008 to 2009, according to all of the estimates, the number of undocumented dropped from 12 million to 11 million, where it has held steady, which means that net inflow must be zero. This is consistent with data I have collected in the Mexican Migration Project, which show a plummeting probability of first migration among Mexican males.

For the moment, at least, the pressure is off at the border. The traffic going back and

forth is minimal, and the border is now so controlled, it is the most controlled border anywhere in the world, with the possible exception of the Korean DMZ.

However, the first pillar of immigration reform is always “get control of the border.” That is the focus, even though more money and increased border enforcement are a complete and total waste of taxpayer money. Although absolutely insane, it may be the price we will have to pay if we are going to solve the problem of the 11 million undocumented people living in the United States without social, economic, or civil rights.

Among these 11 million, about 3 million are people who entered the country as minors and without documents. Probably another million or 1.5 million entered as refugees from Central America, lived here

porary work visas thanks to legislation quietly passed by Congress.

The third pillar is to increase immigration quotas for Mexico and Canada, because we are so intensely linked with our two NAFTA partners. Migrants have in effect already done this themselves by naturalizing in massive numbers and then sponsoring the entry of immediate family members, who are not counted against the quotas. Three-quarters of all legal immigrants from Mexico now enter as sons, daughters, spouses, or parents of an American citizen.

That leaves the fourth pillar of immigration reform: a process of legalization. Here the question is, how much are we going to penalize these people? How many weights will we put on their shoulders as they come above board and try to make their way in the United States?

for these people to get on with their lives in the country where almost all of them have now lived for ten or more years?

That is the dilemma facing us at this point. Lord knows what is going to come out of Congress. The Gang of Eight has made their statement, but the House has yet to speak, and I always hesitate to predict what will come out of the sausage grinder that is Congress until I see the legislation sitting on the president’s desk with a signature on the bottom line. Like all of you, I will be waiting with a great deal of interest to see what happens.

Rising apprehensions were taken as proof that the invasion was continuing. The cycle became self-feeding: throwing money at the Border Patrol produced more apprehension, and increased apprehensions justified more funds for the Border Patrol.

for ten years with temporary protected status, then had that status revoked but did not return home.

Framing all of these individuals as illegal people who willfully crossed the border and violated our laws is really not entirely accurate. Perhaps as many as half of the 11 million migrants ended up in illegal status through no fault of their own.

Several pillars of immigration reform have been identified. The first is getting control of the border, which we have already done. The second is to increase the size of the guest worker program. This, too, we have already done. In 2010, some 500,000 Mexicans entered the United States on tem-

Latinos, in 1970, were only 4.7 percent of the U.S. population. Today, they are 16.3 percent. Within twenty years, they will be approaching 25 percent of the population. This is our demographic future. The question we have to ask ourselves is, do we want to keep mass illegality as a huge barrier to the social and economic integration of this population, or do we want to lift the barrier of mass illegality as expeditiously as possible?

The early reports on the legislation Congress is now drafting suggest a willingness to do something nice for the Dreamers, to give them an easy path in. The real question, though, is what is going to happen to everybody else. How hard will Congress make it



Jorge Castañeda

Jorge Castañeda is Global Distinguished Professor of Politics and Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University. He served as Foreign Minister of Mexico from 2000 to 2003. He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008.

A lot of people in the United States like to say that immigration policy is a domestic issue that must never be negotiated with anybody else. However, the United States negotiated the Bracero Agreement with Mexico in 1942, and we negotiated an agreement two decades later with Cuba. It is very strange that the United States has had, for almost fifty years, a standing immigration agreement with Cuba, a country with which it has no diplomatic relations and which it considers to be its worst enemy in the world, along with North Korea.

Mexico has a lot of things to say in the immigration discussion, and I think it deserves to be at the table.

Legislators, the press, the right wing, and the Democrats in the United States are

What most Mexicans want is a piece of paper that makes them legal so they can earn a better wage, have a credit card, get a mortgage, get a driver's license, lease a car, and put their kids in school. They want to be free of the fear of deportation.

making a big fuss about the path to citizenship. This seems to be the central issue in the debate over the new immigration bill. The Democrats want a path to citizenship because they know that the immigrants who become citizens will vote overwhelmingly Democratic, as they have for years. This is a big deal.

The Republicans, logically enough, do not want that to happen. They have not been doing so well in the popular vote for the presidency. So, the last thing they want is to increase the numbers of people who do not like them and will not vote for them.

So, that is what Washington is debating. But, if you ask most Mexicans, they do not care about a path to citizenship. They are not against it; they are not for it. They simply do not care.

What they want is a piece of paper that makes them legal so they can earn a better wage, have a credit card, get a mortgage, get a driver's license, lease a car, and put their kids in school. They want to be free of the fear of deportation. They want to have all of the things that people with legal status in the United States have.

What matters most to these immigrants – those from Mexico or from one of our smaller Central American neighbors – is not the length of the path but the hoops they must jump through along the way. If the hoops are set too high and are too narrow and difficult to jump through, if the process is too complicated and too expensive, a lot of people will say, “Forget about it!” People will also stay in the closet if they do not have a guarantee of acceptance. The prob-

lem is that once you officially declare, “I am an illegal, and here are my papers; I want to be legal,” you cannot go back in the closet.

If the hoops are not reasonable in terms of money and other requirements, one of two things will happen. Either people will not sign up, or they will respond as Mexicans often do when regulations make life miserable for them: they will use their incredible ingenuity to get around them. That is what we do every day in Mexico City. We do not respect the law or abide by the law. Instead, for breakfast, lunch, and dinner we get around the law. Why? Because we have a lot of inapplicable laws in Mexico.

If U.S. immigration reform leads to too many hoops, it will only create incentives for Mexicans to crawl under, jump over, or go around these obstacles.

Under the U.S. Senate's new temporary work proposal, candidates have to prove they were in the United States before December 31, 2011. How will they do this? What kinds of documents will be accepted as proof?

How about a visa? Well, most applicants do not have a visa; that is why they are illegal. What about their Mexican passport, which was stamped when they entered? Well, they entered illegally through the desert and never had a Mexican passport, so that does not work.

Or does it? Every Mexican, illegal or not, who arrives in the United States is entitled to a Mexican passport or consular ID, and almost all go to the nearest consulate and request one. It is a useful document. It is not perfect because it has all sorts of lim-

itations – many states do not recognize this type of document – but it is much better to have than not to have. Most important, a Mexican passport issued by a consulate in the United States in 2010 is pretty good proof that the person holding the passport was in the country before December 31, 2011. But it is only good proof if the U.S. government will accept it as proof.

Two other issues that will be tremendously important are legal aid in preparing applications and the question of when immigrants have to have certain knowledge of English. Do they need to know English for the first piece of paper? For the green card at ten years? Or for citizenship at thirteen years? If knowledge of English is a requirement at the very beginning and they do not receive intensive and free English-language

Does the United States really think it can secure its southern border without having its southern neighbor secure its own southern border? Solving this issue will be almost impossible without much closer U.S.-Mexican cooperation.

Finally, has immigration from Mexico ended? One of the ways our consulates in the United States know whether new people are coming here is by counting the number of requests they receive for passports or IDs, which are called *matriculas*.

The *matricula* program started in 2001, after 9/11. The IDs are good for six years. Then they have to be renewed. The first big renewal year was 2008 – 2009, and the next will be in 2015. Thus, for all practical purposes, every new passport or *matricula* that is given out in a nonrenewal year is for

regardless. Whether through California or through Arizona or through the Rio Grande Valley (or, as we call it, the Rio Bravo Valley) and Tamaulipas, immigration is going to continue.

The issue is whether we want it to be legal or illegal. The best way to eliminate illegal flows in the future is to make them legal. ■

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To view or listen to the presentations, visit <https://www.amacad.org/content.aspx?d=1282>.

For over a century the tradeoff has been between legal and illegal, not between immigration and non-immigration. Our two countries—our societies, our economies—are far too intensely and closely linked, and have been for such a long time, that immigration—higher skilled, lower skilled, higher wage, lower wage—is going to continue.

education, they will not be able to apply for that initial registration. Why would they even come forward?

Then there is the southern border issue; that is, Mexico's southern border with Central America. Mexico might be a mess, but we are less of a mess than the Central Americans. In Mexico, we have twenty-three willful homicides per 100,000 inhabitants every year. Honduras has about eighty, El Salvador has about a hundred, and Guatemala fifty to sixty. These are infinitely more violent countries than Mexico. And their economic situations are far from buoyant.

a newcomer. Last year New York gave out 120,000; Los Angeles, 250,000.

So, either all of these people want two IDs each – I can't think of a good reason why they would – or an enormous number of Mexicans are still coming.

For over a century the tradeoff has been between legal and illegal, not between immigration and nonimmigration. Our two countries – our societies, our economies – are far too intensely and closely linked, and have been for such a long time, that immigration – higher skilled, lower skilled, higher wage, lower wage – is going to go on

Dædalus Examines “Immigration & the Future of America”

Despite America’s history and reputation as a “melting pot,” immigration continues to polarize policy-makers. The Summer 2013 issue of *Dædalus* examines the origins and characteristics of new immigrants and considers their reception in the United States, with regard to both public policies and private behavior. The issue is guest edited by Academy Fellow **Douglas S. Massey** (Princeton University), a leading expert in the sociology of immigration.

Whereas immigration to the United States during the half-century from 1915 to 1965 was small by historical standards, the four decades from 1970 to 2010 witnessed a remarkable revival of population flows from abroad. By 2010, the percentage of foreigners in the United States had rebounded to nearly 13 percent, much closer to its historical peak of 14.7 percent in 1910. Most of the new entrants hailed from Asia and Latin America.

Unlike past immigrants, many foreigners living in the United States today are present without authorization. According to estimates, roughly one-third of these individuals are undocumented, and although Hispanics and Asians now account for around 20 percent of the total population, they make up nearly a third of all births. Thus, the future of the United States is very much tied to the status and welfare of immigrants and their children.

Guest editor **Douglas Massey** notes in his essay, *America’s Immigration Policy Fiasco*, that mass illegality is now the greatest barrier to the successful integration of Latinos; a pathway to legalization represents a critical policy challenge. If U.S. policy-makers wish to avoid the failures of the past, he argues, they must shift from a goal of immigration suppression to one of immigration management within an increasingly integrated North American market.

“Immigration policies implemented in 1965 and thereafter were not founded on any rational, evidence-based understanding of international migration. Instead, they were enacted for domestic political purposes and reveal more about America’s hopes and aspirations – and its fears and apprehensions – than anything having to do with immigrants or immigration per se.”

Print and Kindle copies of the new issue can be ordered at: http://www.amacad.org/publications/daedalus/summer2013/daedalus_Summer2013.pdf. ■

Summer 2013 *Dædalus* “Immigration & the Future of America”

- Douglas S. Massey** (Princeton University): *America’s Immigration Policy Fiasco: Learning from Past Mistakes*
- Nancy Foner** (Hunter College, City University of New York): *Immigration Past and Present*
- Charles Hirschman** (University of Washington): *The Contributions of Immigrants to American Culture*
- Marta Tienda** (Princeton University) & **Susana M. Sánchez** (Pennsylvania State University): *Latin American Immigration to the United States*
- Victor Nee** (Cornell University) & **Hilary Holbrow** (Cornell University): *Why Asian Americans are Becoming Mainstream*
- Audrey Singer** (Brookings Institution): *Contemporary Immigrant Gateways in Historical Perspective*
- Mary C. Waters** (Harvard University) & **Philip Kasinitz** (Graduate Center, City University of New York): *Immigrants in New York: Reaping the Benefits of Continuous Immigration*
- Helen B. Marrow** (Tufts University): *Assimilation in New Destinations*
- Frank D. Bean** (University of California, Irvine), **Jennifer Lee** (University of California, Irvine) & **James D. Bachmeier** (Temple University): *Immigration and the Color Line at the Beginning of the 21st Century*
- Rubén G. Rumbaut** (University of California, Irvine) and **Douglas S. Massey** (Princeton University): *Immigration and Language Diversity in the United States*
- Richard Alba** (Graduate Center, City University of New York): *Schools and the Diversity Transition*
- Alejandro Portes** (Princeton University) & **Adrienne Celaya** (University of Miami): *Modernization for Emigration: Determinants and Consequences of the Brain Drain*
- Michael Jones-Correa** (Cornell University) & **Els de Graauw** (Baruch College, City University of New York): *The Illegality Trap: The Politics of Immigration and the Lens of Illegality*
- Karen Manges Douglas** (Sam Houston State University) & **Rogelio Sáenz** (University of Texas at San Antonio): *The Criminalization of Immigrants and the Immigration-Industrial Complex*
- Cristina M. Rodríguez** (Yale Law School): *Immigration, Civil Rights, and the Evolution of the People*

Academy Convenes Symposium in Hiroshima on Nuclear Safety and Security

How can nuclear technology be made safer? How should nuclear installations be protected from potential attacks by terrorist groups and from sabotage carried out by insiders? What policies should aspiring nuclear countries enact to fulfill their global commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)?

These questions and others were discussed at a recent Academy symposium held in Hiroshima, Japan, on June 26–28, 2013. The meeting, organized by the Codirectors of the Academy's Global Nuclear Future Initiative, **Scott D. Sagan** (Stanford University) and **Steven E. Miller** (Harvard Kennedy School), with Senior Advisor **Robert Rosner** (University of Chicago), was cosponsored by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the "Hiroshima for Global Peace" Joint Project Executive Committee.

Hiroshima continues to stand as a stark and compelling symbol of the threat posed by the enduring presence of nuclear weapons around the world. The city is working to contribute actively to nuclear disarmament and to become a thriving hub for intellectual debate on nuclear issues. The choice of Hiroshima as the venue for the Academy's symposium acknowledges the city's expanding role in this global debate.

The two-day symposium, *Learning from Fukushima: Improving Nuclear Safety and Security after Accidents*, brought together nuclear experts from Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to discuss the March 11, 2011, nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and identify lessons on how to better prepare for, and respond to, nuclear accidents in the future.

The symposium included panels on nuclear safety and security issues. In one panel discussion, nuclear experts **Laurence G. Williams** (University of Central Lancashire), **Edward Blandford** (University of New Mexico), and **Nobumasa Akiyama** (Hitotsubashi University) highlighted the need for all nuclear countries to establish and maintain a truly independent nuclear regulatory authority, to develop and continuously update comprehensive defense systems, and to prepare operators of nuclear power plants and

political leaders to take action in post-nuclear accident crises.

In another presentation, **Scott Sagan** suggested that despite significant progress to strengthen nuclear safety regulations, in Japan and elsewhere in the world, efforts to protect nuclear installations from the threat posed by terrorist groups have substantially lagged behind. Nuclear operators continue to underestimate the potential danger posed by insiders. Sagan suggested the adoption of a suite of precautionary measures, such as reinforcing the physical protection of nuclear installations, conducting thorough background checks and trustworthiness tests of all personnel working within nuclear facilities, and establishing an anonymous reporting system that allows workers to report suspicious activities within a plant without fear of retaliation.

Other panels featured speakers from across South and Southeast Asia, including **Itty Abraham** (National University of Singapore), **Thitinan Pongsudhirak**



Tatsujiro Suzuki (Japan Atomic Energy Commission), **Robert Rosner** (University of Chicago), **Laurence G. Williams** (University of Central Lancashire), and **Scott D. Sagan** (Stanford University)



Nobumasa Akiyama (Hitotsubashi University)

(Chulalongkorn University, Thailand), Tanya Ogilvie-White (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), and Mohit Abraham (PXV Partners, New Delhi). The speakers discussed how the developing Vietnamese nuclear program will affect political stability in Southeast Asia, and they also explored the nuclear liability rules that seek to ensure that victims of nuclear accidents receive adequate compensation.

The conference included a public symposium organized by the Office of Governor Hidehiko Yuzaki of Hiroshima Prefecture. During the public meeting, Robert Rosner urged aspiring nuclear countries such as Vietnam to consider options for nuclear waste management at an early stage of their nuclear planning cycle to avoid the difficulties encountered by South Korea and Japan. Tatsujiro Suzuki (Japan Atomic Energy Commission) discussed the main institutional changes that had taken place in Japan's nuclear sector since the

Fukushima accident in order to regain the trust and confidence of the public.

The Global Nuclear Future Initiative is supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Academy is grateful to these foundations for advancing the work of the Initiative. ■

Time to Play Ball



Keith R. Yamamoto

Cochair of the ARISE II committee, Keith R. Yamamoto is Vice Chancellor for Research, Executive Vice Dean of the School of Medicine, and Professor of Cellular and Molecular Pharmacology at the University of California, San Francisco. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

What if baseball were organized like science? Aspiring catchers or shortstops, like students of physics or molecular biology, would be trained by professional counterparts, and top prospects with dazzling skills would turn pro without learning that by combining their specialized talents, they could create an entirely different game. Managers, owners, and marketers would seek and reward individual stars at each position but would not facilitate or nurture a team culture or even a team game. In science, traditions, policies, and bureaucracies isolate scientific disciplines and their discoveries and technologies, squandering exciting opportunities that could be empowered by merged ideas and efforts—in short, by teamwork. A recent report from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

asserts that knocking down such boundaries would reveal great new opportunities; indeed, a new game.

The report, *ARISE II: Unleashing America's Research & Innovation Enterprise*,¹ crafted by a committee from academia and the private sector, sees the scientific endeavor today as daunted by the challenge of extracting understanding from floods of disconnected data that threaten to swamp every discipline. To achieve understanding demands unprecedented levels of integration along two separate but intersecting planes. One plane embodies deep collaboration across the physical and life sciences, from basic discovery through the many branches of development and application. It is a call for a new synthesis, reaching well beyond the shared facilities and multidisciplinary programs that are now quite common, toward entities in which the expertise and imagination of researchers and practitioners from separate fields synergize to achieve “transdisciplinarity.” The other plane of integration involves the major stakeholder sectors in the scientific enterprise: academia, government, private industry, and nonprofit organizations. They must move beyond ad hoc “deals” and establish policies, training programs, and mechanisms that bring together people, knowledge, and resources across current stakeholder boundaries.

How might these lofty goals be achieved? The committee advanced 11 specific recommendations. One calls for a revolutionary computational “knowledge network,” expanding on a 2011 National Research Council report.² This continuously evolving information commons—an electronic resource—would recognize and display links between approaches, findings, and investigators in different fields and sectors,

suggesting unrecognized hypotheses or predictions, and “self-assembling” potential teams of collaborators that can address issues that might not otherwise even have been formulated.

To promote synergies among the stakeholder sectors, “grand challenges” were proposed at sufficient scale and scope to capture public imagination, strike creative sparks among both individual investigators and self-assembled teams across the continuum, and incentivize support and participation from multiple stakeholders. Grand challenges seem to be in style these days, albeit at modest scales compared to those envisioned here, but some may provide preliminary glimpses of multistakeholder buy-in. Other recommendations reach toward the broad goals of the report: overhaul academic promotion policies, devise transdisciplinary curricula in which students learn and work in teams, establish technology transfer mechanisms that prioritize knowledge exchange over revenue, create policies that acknowledge and manage conflicts of interest rather than claim to eliminate them, and incentivize cooperation among government agencies. Again, isolated efforts in some of these directions are under way. What is needed is a coordinated strategy. Universities, companies, and private entities that work cooperatively will themselves benefit, and in turn provoke others to join. The impact on science and society could be transformative, not just nationally but globally. Implementing the recommendations of *ARISE II* may not yield a *Field of Dreams*, but everyone will get a better chance to play ball. ■

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¹ *ARISE II* is available at <https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/publication.aspx?d=1138>.

² Available at www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13284.

Select Awards

2013 Presidential Medal of Freedom

William Clinton (William J. Clinton Foundation)

Daniel Kahneman (Princeton University)

Richard G. Lugar (Georgetown University; Indiana University; University of Indianapolis)

Patricia Wald (Washington, D.C.)

2012 National Humanities Medal

Edward L. Ayers (University of Richmond)

William G. Bowen (Princeton, NJ)

Jill Ker Conway (Boston, MA)

Natalie Zemon Davis (University of Toronto)

Joan Didion (New York, NY)

Robert Putnam (Harvard University)

Marilynne Robinson (University of Iowa)

Robert B. Silvers (*New York Review of Books*)

2012 National Medal of Arts

Renée Fleming (New York, NY)

Ellsworth Kelly (Spencertown, NY)

Tony Kushner (Heat & Light Co.)

George Lucas (Skywalker Properties, Ltd.)

Laurie Olin (Olin Partnership)

The Queen Elizabeth Prize for Engineering

Tim Berners-Lee (World Wide Web Consortium; Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Vinton Cerf (Google Inc.)

Robert Kahn (Corporation for National Research Initiatives)

Other Awards

Nancy C. Andrews (Duke University School of Medicine) is the recipient of the 2013 Henry M. Stratton Medal for Basic Research from the American Society of Hematology.

Angela Belcher (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the 2013 Lemelson-MIT Prize.

Richard Carlson (Carnegie Institution for Science) was awarded the Arthur L. Day Medal from the Geological Society of America.

David Donoho (Renaissance Technologies Corporation; Stanford University) was awarded the 2013 Shaw Prize in Mathematical Sciences.

James Fujimoto (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the 2014 IEEE Photonics Award.

Jeffrey C. Hall (Cambridge, Maine) was awarded the 2013 Shaw Prize in Life Science and Medicine. He shares the prize with **Michael Rosbash** (Brandeis University) and **Michael W. Young** (Rockefeller University).

Katherine A. High (University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine; Children's Hospital of Philadelphia) was awarded the 2013 E. Donnell Thomas Prize by the American Society of Hematology.

Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University) received the 2013 ACM SIGKDD Innovation Award from the Association for Computing Machinery.

Stephen J. Lippard (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is the recipient of the 2014 Priestley Medal from the American Chemical Society.

Eve Marder (Brandeis University) is the recipient of the 2013 Gruber Neuroscience Prize.

Harry McSween (University of Tennessee) is the recipient of the Whipple Award from the American Geophysical Union.

Everett Mendelsohn (Harvard University) was awarded a 2013 Centennial Medal from Harvard University.

Felix Mitelman (University of Lund, Sweden) received the European Society of Human Genetics Award (2013).

Jeremy Nathans (Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine) received the Arthur Kornberg and Paul Berg Lifetime Achievement Award in Biomedical Sciences. He shares the award with **Louis Reichardt** (University of California, San Francisco).

Victor Navasky (*The Nation*; Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism) received the Richard M. Clurman Award.

Masatoshi Nei (Pennsylvania State University) is the recipient of the 2013 Kyoto Prize in Basic Sciences.

Louis Reichardt (University of California, San Francisco) received the Arthur Kornberg and Paul Berg Lifetime Achievement Award in Biomedical Sciences. He shares the award with **Jeremy Nathans** (Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine).

Michael Rosbash (Brandeis University) was awarded the 2013 Shaw Prize in Life Science and Medicine. He shares the prize with **Jeffrey C. Hall** (Cambridge, Maine) and **Michael W. Young** (Rockefeller University).

Michael Sorkin (Michael Sorkin Studio; City College of New York) is the recipient of the 2013 National Design Award.

Richard Stallman (Free Software Foundation) was recently inducted into the Internet Hall of Fame.

Steven M. Stanley (University of Hawaii) is the recipient of the 2013 Geological Society of America Penrose Medal.

Select Publications

Fiction

E. L. Doctorow (New York University). *Andrew's Brain*. Random House, January 2014

Thomas Keneally (Manly, Australia). *The Daughters of Mars: A Novel*. Atria Books, August 2013

Nonfiction

Peter Ackroyd (*The Times*). *Tudors: The History of England from Henry VIII to Elizabeth I*. St. Martin's Press/Thomas Dunne Books, October 2013

Svetlana Alpers (New York University). *Roof Life*. Yale University Press, August 2013

Mary Beard (University of Cambridge). *Confronting the Classics: Traditions, Adventures, and Innovations*. W.W. Norton, September 2013

Victor Brombert (Princeton University). *Musings on Mortality: From Tolstoy to Primo Levi*. University of Chicago Press, October 2013

James MacGregor Burns (University of Richmond). *Fire and Light: How the Enlightenment Transformed Our World*. Thomas Dunne Books, October 2013

Stanley Crouch (*New York Daily News*). *Kansas City Lightning: The Rise and Times of Charlie Parker*. Harper, September 2013

Thomas Ehrlich (Stanford University) and **Ernestine Fu** (Stanford University). *Civic Work, Civic Lessons: Two Generations Reflect on Public Service*. Rowman & Littlefield/University Press of America, July 2013

Martin Filler (New York, NY). *Makers of Modern Architecture, Vol. II: From Le Corbusier to Rem Koolhaas*. New York Review Books, August 2013

Nancy Foner (Hunter College and Graduate Center, CUNY), ed. *One Out of Three: Immigrant New York in the Twenty-First Century*. Columbia University Press, June 2013

Linda Hutcheon (University of Toronto). *Narcissistic Narrative: The Metafictional Paradox*. Wilfrid Laurier University Press, May 2013

Randall Kennedy (Harvard Law School). *For Discrimination: Race, Affirmative Action, and the Law*. Pantheon, September 2013

Leon Lederman (Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy) and Christopher Hill (Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory). *Beyond the God Particle*. Prometheus Books, October 2013

Diane Ravitch (New York University). *Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization Movement and the Danger to America's Public Schools*. Knopf, September 2013

Robert Rotberg (Harvard Kennedy School). *Africa Emerges: Consummate Challenges, Abundant Opportunities*. Polity, June 2013

Laurence Senelick (Tufts University). *Stanislavsky: A Life in Letters*. Routledge, October 2013

Ajit Varki (University of California, San Diego) and Danny Brower (University of Arizona). *Denial: Self-Deception, False Beliefs, and the Origins of the Human Mind*. Twelve Books/Hachette Book Group, June 2013

Brenda Wineapple (New York, NY). *Ecstatic Nation: Confidence, Crisis, and Compromise, 1848–1877*. Harper, August 2013

Gavin Wright (Stanford University). *Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the American South*. Harvard University Press, February 2013

New Appointments

Fred E. Cohen (TPG; University of California, San Francisco) was elected to the Board of Directors of BioCryst Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Harvey V. Fineberg (Institute of Medicine) has been named Chairman of the Board of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

Annette Gordon-Reed (Harvard University) was appointed to the Board of the National Book Foundation.

Gwen Ifill (WETA) will anchor the PBS *NewsHour* with **Judy Woodruff** (PBS *NewsHour*).

Jane Lubchenco (Oregon State University) has been appointed to the Board of Trustees of the David and Lucile Packard Foundation.

Anthony W. Marx (New York Public Library) was appointed to the Board of the National Book Foundation.

James Moeser (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) was appointed interim Chancellor of the University of North Carolina School of the Arts.

Judy Woodruff (PBS *NewsHour*) will anchor the PBS *NewsHour* with **Gwen Ifill** (WETA).

Exhibitions

Jerry Pinkney (Jerry Pinkney Studio). *Witness: The Art of Jerry Pinkney*. Philadelphia Museum of Art through September 2013

We invite all Fellows and Foreign Honorary Members to send notices about their recent and forthcoming publications, scientific findings, exhibitions and performances, and honors and prizes to bulletin@amacad.org. ■

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OF ARTS & SCIENCES

Norton's Woods, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138
telephone 617-576-5000, facsimile 617-576-5050,
email aaas@amacad.org, website www.amacad.org

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Bulletin Summer 2013

Issued as Volume LXVI, Number 4

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The Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences (ISSN 0002-712X) is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Periodicals rate postage paid at Boston, MA, and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to *Bulletin*, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

The views expressed in the *Bulletin* are those held by each contributor and are not necessarily those of the Officers and Fellows of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.

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Hiroshima Prefecture	pages 48 – 49

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
Cambridge, MA 02138-1996 USA

telephone 617-576-5000

facsimile 617-576-5050

email aaas@amacad.org

website www.amacad.org



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OF ARTS & SCIENCES